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With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or Maybe Not:
A Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After
Three Decades
J. THOMAS OLDHAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
As Hogarth reminds us, in English society when children of the wealthy
marry it has been common for centuries for the parties (or their parents) to
negotiate an agreement before marriage regarding the couple’s finances.1 In
more recent times in the United States, couples marrying later in life after raising
children with another partner frequently have signed premarital agreements
clarifying their respective inheritance rights, and such agreements have generally
been enforced. What is relatively new in Anglo-American law is the acceptance
of the idea that prospective spouses via a premarital agreement can alter the
parties’ respective rights and obligations if they divorce.
This novel idea (for a non-civil law country) was first announced in the U.S.
in an opinion written by the Florida Supreme Court in 1970.2 In the early 1980s,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws authorized a
group to attempt to draft a uniform law outlining the rules that should govern
how to determine whether to enforce such an agreement. The result was the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (the UPAA), which was promulgated in
1983. Since then, some states have adopted the UPAA. Many have not adopted
it or have adopted it with some modifications.
During the past four decades, all U.S. states have accepted the general idea
that spouses may make an enforceable agreement specifying the economic
consequences of divorce. There is substantial disagreement, however, regarding
whether the right to spousal support can be affected, as well as which rules
ought to be applied to determine whether to enforce the agreement. States
disagree both as to the mandated procedural requirements for entering into such
agreements as well whether there should be some sort of review of the

* John Freeman Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I would like to thank
Professors Bill Atkin, Nick Bala, Nina Dethloff, and Patrick Parkinson for help with the comparative
information set forth in this article. Barbara Atwood, Naomi Cahn, June Carbone and Judith Younger
provided helpful comments to earlier drafts. I would also like to thank UHLC law student Lisa
Baiocchi-Mooney for her research assistance, Dan Baker for obtaining numerous books, periodicals,
and cases from the library, and Amanda Parker for her speedy and careful administrative help.
1. See HOGARTH’S MARRIAGE À-LA-MODE (Judy Egerton, ed. 1997); Lloyd Bonfield, Property
Settlements on Marriage in England from the Anglo-Saxons to the Mid-Eighteenth Century, in MARRIAGE,
PROPERTY, AND SUCCESSION 287, 292–93 (Lloyd Bonfield ed., 1992); LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY,
SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500–1800, at 30–31, 87 (1977). For a French perspective, see
generally HONORÉ DE BALZAC, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1835).
2. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
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substantive fairness of the agreement either at the time of signing or at divorce.
The UPAA reflects a policy judgment that there should not be substantial
procedural requirements for entering into such agreements and that no review of
the fairness of the agreement at divorce is appropriate. In this regard, the policy
judgments reflected in the UPAA differ from those adopted in a number of other
states and other countries during the three decades since promulgation of the
UPAA.
In 2010, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
appointed a committee to draft a new uniform act to set forth, among other
things, standards for determining the enforceability of premarital agreements.
The committee presumably will review the UPAA and consider whether any
modification of the UPAA would now be appropriate.3 This article will compare
the provisions of the UPAA to the rules now applied in states that have not
adopted the UPAA and in other countries to determine when to enforce a
premarital agreement that contemplates divorce. I will argue that the UPAA is
not consistent with the consensus evolving in other states and countries
regarding what needs to be established before a premarital agreement should be
enforced. I will suggest various possible amendments to the UPAA so the UPAA
could be made more consistent with rules in other states and international
trends.
II. STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE UPAA
A. Those States That Adopted the UPAA in Its Entirety
Thirteen states have adopted the UPAA with no significant changes.4 The
uniform act authorizes both the restriction or elimination of divisible property
upon divorce5 and the restriction or elimination of spousal support.6 A waiver of
spousal support is effective unless the lack of support would cause a party to
become a public charge; if this would occur, the court is authorized to award
support in an amount sufficient to avoid such a result.7 An agreement is
presumptively valid, and the person challenging the agreement has the burden
to show it is not enforceable. To overturn an agreement, the challenging party
must show either that the agreement was: (i) not signed “voluntarily” (not

3. To view the Committee list and links to related documents, see Premarital and Marital
Agreements, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/committee.aspx?title=Premarital%20
and%20marital%20Agreements (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). The committee expects to present a draft
for final approval in July 2012. Id.
4. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-201 et seq. (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-401 et seq. (2009);
DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 13, § 321 et seq. (2009); HAW, REV. STAT. § 572D-1 et seq. (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-921 et seq. (2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., 40/2601 et seq. (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23801 et seq. (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-601 et seq. (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42.1001 et seq. (2011);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52B-1 et seq. (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 108.700 et seq. (2009); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 4.001 et seq. (Vernon 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-147 et seq. (2011); D.C. CODE § 46-501 et
seq. (2005).
5. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, §3(3), 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001).
6. See id. § 3(4).
7. See id. § 6(b).
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defined)8 or (ii) “unconscionable” (not defined) when signed, and that the person
challenging the agreement did not receive adequate disclosure of financial
information regarding the other party, did not waive the right to such
information, and did not otherwise have access to such information.9 In other
words, an agreement that is unconscionable when signed is still enforceable if
there was adequate disclosure of financial information, a waiver of the right to
disclosure, or the party otherwise had access to such information. Any change in
the circumstances of the parties after the wedding is not relevant to the issue of
enforcement. The receipt of advice from independent counsel might be relevant
to the issue of voluntary execution but is not required.10
B. Those Adopting States That Made Changes to the UPAA
i. Voluntary Execution
In contrast to the thirteen states that adopted the UPAA without substantial
revision, a significant number of other states chose to adopt the UPAA, but only
after some revisions. For example, the California version of the UPAA contains
significant changes.11 The UPAA specifies that an agreement should not be
enforced if it is not signed voluntarily;12 no definition of voluntariness is given,
nor are any factors listed that should be taken into consideration when making
this determination. In contrast, the California statute attempts to clarify the
standard for voluntary execution. The statute specifies that an agreement should
be found to be voluntarily signed only if: (i) the party against whom enforcement
is sought either had independent counsel or waived that right in writing; (ii) the
party against whom enforcement is sought was given at least seven days to
consider whether to sign the agreement; and (iii) the party against whom
enforcement is sought, if unrepresented by counsel, was fully informed in
writing of the terms and basic effect of the agreement as well as the rights and
obligations he or she was giving up by signing the agreement.13
Other state versions of the UPAA have modified the provision pertaining to
voluntary execution. The Florida statute lets a party challenge an agreement
either on the ground of “involuntariness” or by showing that the agreement was
procured by “fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching.”14 In Rhode Island, an
agreement may be challenged only if it is shown that the agreement was not
voluntarily signed, the agreement was unconscionable when signed, and the
challenging party did not receive adequate financial information.15

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See id. § 6(a)(1).
See id. § 6(a)(2).
See generally id. §6.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c) (West 2004).
See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(1).
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.079 (7) (West 2011).
See R. I. GEN. LAWS § 15-17-6 (2003).
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ii. Unconscionability
Likewise, many states that have adopted the UPAA changed the rules
applicable to challenging the agreement based on unconscionability. To
challenge an agreement under the UPAA on the ground of unconscionability, the
uniform act requires a substantial showing.16 First, the agreement must be found
to be unconscionable at the time of signing (not at the time of divorce).17 If this is
established, the challenging party must also show that the financial disclosure to
that party was inadequate, that the objecting party did not waive the right to
such disclosure, and that the objecting party did not otherwise know that
information.18
A number of states have modified this provision in some manner. For
example, under the Connecticut provision, the agreement is not to be enforced if
it is unconscionable either at the time of signing or when it is to be enforced.19
An agreement can be successfully challenged in Indiana or Nevada by
establishing that the agreement was unconscionable at the time of signing,
regardless of whether there was adequate disclosure of financial information.20
In New Jersey, an agreement can be successfully challenged if unconscionable
when enforcement is sought.21 In North Dakota, if enforcement of the agreement
would be unconscionable, the court may: (i) refuse to enforce it in its entirety, (ii)
enforce a severable portion of the agreement without the unconscionable
provisions, or (iii) limit the application of the unconscionable provisions to avoid
an unconscionable result.22
The UPAA does not define “unconscionable.”23 One state has attempted to
clarify the meaning of this term. In New Jersey, an agreement is unconscionable
if it leaves a party without a means of reasonable support or would provide a
standard of living for a party far below what the party enjoyed before the
marriage.24
iii. Limiting Spousal Support
The UPAA authorizes the elimination of spousal support and does not
permit a review of the fairness of such a provision at divorce unless the waiving
party would become a public charge. Some states have made it easier to
challenge an alimony waiver. For example, in Indiana an alimony waiver is not
fully enforceable if the waiver would cause extreme hardship under
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at the time of signing.25 If this occurs,

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § (6)(a)(2).
See id.
See id.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36g(a)(2) (West 2009).
See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-3-8 (West 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123A.080 (2010).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-37 (West 2002).
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (2009).
See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-32 (West 2011).
See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-3-8.
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the court may award support to the extent necessary to avoid that hardship.26 In
Iowa, South Dakota, and New Mexico, an agreement cannot impact the right to
spousal support.27 Additionally, a waiver of spousal support could be
challenged as unconscionable at the time of divorce in Connecticut, New Jersey,
or North Dakota, as discussed in the preceding section.28
California sets forth more detailed rules regarding agreements limiting
spousal support. A provision restricting the right to spousal support is not
enforceable if: (i) the party against whom enforcement is sought was not
represented by independent counsel in connection with signing the agreement,
or (ii) the provision is unconscionable at the time of enforcement.29
iv. Inadequate Disclosure
In some “adopting” states, an agreement is not enforceable if the
challenging party was not given fair and reasonable financial information, did
not waive the right to such information, and did not already know the
information, regardless of whether the agreement was also unconscionable when
signed.30 The Connecticut statute seems to compel financial disclosure; there is
no mention of satisfying this requirement via a waiver or some other way of
informally acquiring this information.31 In Arkansas, a waiver of the right to
receive disclosure of financial information is valid only if the party was
represented by counsel.32
Under the UPAA the challenging party must show that he or she did not
receive “fair and reasonable” disclosure.33 The California statute demands proof
of “fair, reasonable and full” disclosure.34
v. Other Provisions
Some states that adopted the UPAA have added additional rules. For
example, in Maine an agreement is void eighteen months after the parties
become biological or adoptive parents unless the parties reaffirm the agreement
during that period.35

26. Id.
27. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.5 (West 2001); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-4 (2011); Sanford v.
Sanford, 694 N.W.2d 283, 289 (S.D. 2005).
28. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36g(a)(2) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-37; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (2009).
29. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (West 2004).
30. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.8(3); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 37.2-38(c).
31. See CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. § 46b-36g (West 2009).
32. ARK. CODE ANN. §9-11-406(a)(2)(ii) (2009).
33. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001).
34. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(a)(2)(A).
35. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 606 (1998). This provision does not apply to agreements
signed after October 1, 1993. Id. For a general survey of the manner in which some adopting states
modified the UPAA, see generally Amberlynn Curry, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Its
Variations Throughout the States, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 355 (2010).
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C. Summary
About half of all states have adopted the UPAA in some form. However,
before enactment many adopting states altered the uniform law in one or more
material ways that make it easier to challenge a premarital agreement. For
example, in some states the unconscionability of the agreement is to be
determined at divorce, not the time of signing, and in a number of states a
finding of unconscionability alone is grounds for a successful challenge. Others
do not permit a limitation on the right to spousal support or require independent
counsel as a condition of such a provision. California has endeavored to clarify
how to determine whether an agreement was signed “voluntarily,” while New
Jersey has attempted to define what an “unconscionable” agreement is. If the
parties have a biologic or adoptive child during marriage, to maintain the
effectiveness of the agreement for agreements signed before 1993, Maine
required parties to reaffirm the agreement soon after the arrival of a biological or
adoptive child. So, a significant number of “adopting” states disagree with one
or more basic policy judgments reflected in the UPAA.
III. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
About half of all states have not adopted the UPAA, and many apply
standards significantly different from the UPAA to determine whether to enforce
such agreements. The discussion below compares the policy judgments
incorporated into the UPAA to the rules now applied in states that have not
adopted the UPAA to determine whether to enforce a premarital agreement.
A. Voluntary Execution
Almost all states theoretically require premarital agreements to be signed
voluntarily or without duress. States have tended to construe both terms
similarly.
i. Involuntariness
While the UPAA requires voluntary execution, it provides no additional
guidance about how to determine whether execution is voluntary or involuntary.
The California Supreme Court discussed the factors it felt should be relevant to a
determination of voluntary execution in In re Marriage of Bonds.36 The court
concluded that these factors should focus on: the relative bargaining power of
the parties; whether there was coercion; whether the agreement was signed
shortly before the wedding; the presence of independent counsel for the waiving
party; and whether the waiving party understood the terms, purpose, and effect
of the agreement.37 Since the Bonds case, some other courts have generally
approved of this analysis.38

36. In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 824–26 (Cal. 2000).
37. Id. at 824–26.
38. See In re Estate of Smid, 756 N.W.2d 1, 16 (S.D. 2008); In re Marriage of Rudder, 217 P.3d 183,
189–91 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
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The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that “the timing of the
agreement is of paramount importance in assessing whether [an agreement was
voluntarily signed].”39 Another approach is to look to Black’s Law Dictionary,
which defines “voluntary” as “intentionally; without coercion.”40 Some courts
equate a voluntarily executed premarital agreement with one free from duress or
undue influence.41 Duress requires a wrongful or unlawful threat which gives
the other party no reasonable alternative.42 Undue influence is influence that
deprives a person of his or her freedom of choice.43
Regardless of whether UPAA courts apply the Bonds factors to determine
voluntary execution or consider whether there was duress or undue influence,
what is remarkable is that many courts have upheld the agreement despite unfair
bargaining tactics. Although in rare instances a premarital agreement provides
additional rights to the spouse with fewer assets,44 the “stereotypic” voluntary
execution case involves this scenario: the wealthier party decides he or she wants
a premarital agreement to limit the other party’s financial claims if the parties
divorce.45 The wealthier party instructs his or her lawyer to draft an agreement

39. Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533, 551 (Conn. 2007) (quoting 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and Wife §
101).
40. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1605 (8th ed. 2004). For cases that have considered this definition,
see In re Rudder, 217 P.3d at 190; In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 512 (Iowa 2008).
41. See In re Shanks, 758 N.W.2d at 512.
42. Id. at 513.
43. Id.
44. See Marsh v. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d 734, 737–38 (Tex. App. 1997); Weber v. Weber, 589 N.W.2d
358, 359 (N.D. 1999); Carnell v. Carnell, 398 So.2d 503 (Fla. App. 1981).
45. See In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003) (involving a party desiring an agreement
who had a net worth of $6,000,000 while the other party’s assets were worth $5,000); Mallen v.
Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. 2005) (involving proponent with net worth of $8,500,000 while the other
party’s assets were worth $10,000); Hoag v. Dick, 799 A.2d 391 (Me. 2002) (involving proponent of
agreement who owned assets worth more than $1,000,000 while the other owned assets of “negligible
value”); Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So.2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (involving proponent’s assets worth
$800,000 with the other’s worth $12,000); Potts v. Potts, 303 S.W.3d 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (involving
proponent who had assets of $627,000 while the other party’s assets were worth $5,000); Hiemstra v.
Hiemstra, 2010 WL 1433880 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (involving proponent who had a net
worth of about $6 million while the other party’s net worth was less than $200,000); Austin v. Austin,
839 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. 2005) (involving proponent’s net worth of $1,000,000 where the waiving
party’s assets were worth $35,000); Wiethe v. Beaty, 1999 WL 74595 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (involving
proponent who owned $2,000,000 in assets while the other party owned assets worth $441,000);
McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989) (involving proponent with net worth of
$1,400,000 while the other party’s assets were worth $100,000); In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815
(Cal. 2000) (involving proponent whose annual income at the time of signing was $106,000 in the late
1980s and likely to increase while the waiving party “had worked as a waitress and a bartender”);
Edwards v. Edwards, 744 N.W.2d 243 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (involving proponent’s assets which
exceeded $1,700,000 while the waiving party’s assets were worth $28,000); In re Marriage of Barnes,
755 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (involving proponent’s annual salary which was “in excess of”
$250,000 (plus “various perks”) at the time of execution while the waiving party’s annual salary was
$19,000); Margulies v. Margulies, 491 So.2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (involving proponent who
had a net worth of at least $50 million while the other party was a flight attendant); Sogg v. Nev. State
Bank, 832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992) (involving proponent’s net worth of $20 million where the other party
did not have “substantial financial resources”); Warren v. Warren, 523 N.E.2d 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(involving proponent who was a multimillionaire while the other party was a secretary); DeMatteo v.
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that protects that party and limits the claims of the other party (or perhaps even
eliminates such claims) if the parties divorce. The wealthier party then presents
the agreement to the other party shortly before the planned wedding, frequently
a day or two before, and states that he or she is willing to marry only if the
agreement is signed.46 This leaves the less wealthy party belatedly learning of
the agreement in a very difficult situation. That party has to decide whether to
try to get legal advice and, if legal advice is desired, to determine how to obtain
competent advice within twenty-four or forty-eight hours, and perhaps on a
weekend day when most lawyers are not in their offices. Then the party must
attempt to negotiate the agreement at the last minute and decide whether to sign
the agreement or postpone or cancel the wedding after guests from out of town
have begun to arrive.
In many cases, the wealthy party presents the agreement and states that he
or she will not marry unless it is signed. This is generally not perceived by
courts to be unfair bargaining. Each party is thought to be under no obligation to
marry and can set forth certain prerequisites and conditions that must be
satisfied before he or she will marry.47 As a general principle, it is not unfair
bargaining for a person to specify to his partner the terms based upon which the
party would be willing to marry. Whether it is unfair bargaining to present an
agreement at the last minute and then tell your partner that the marriage will
occur only if the partner signs it is another matter.
DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002) (involving proponent who owned assets valued in excess of
$83 million while the other party had a net worth of less than $5,000); Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533
(Conn. 2007) (involving proponent with net worth of $6.5 million, while the other party owned assets
amounting to $22,000); Gardner v. Gardner, 527 N.W.2d 701 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (involving
proponent whose assets amounted to more than $3 million while the assets of the other party
amounted to $22,000); Adams v. Adams, 603 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. 2004) (involving proponent whose assets
were valued at $4,526,708 while the other party’s were worth $30,000); In re Marriage of Berger, 829
N.E.2d 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (involving proponent who owned assets worth $10 million while the
other party’s net worth was $149,000); Millstein v. Millstein, 2002 WL 31031676 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
(involving proponent whose net worth was $28 million while the other party’s assets were worth
$10,000). This certainly is the normal assumption lawyers make about the purpose of a premarital
agreement. See, e.g., Premarital Agreement Basic Form: Anticipating the Needs of the Monied Spouse, 18
FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1995, at 8–9. Professor Atwood notes that the party being asked to waive
rights frequently is the woman. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About
the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. Legis. 127, 133 n.29 (1993). Of course, women do
sometimes propose a premarital agreement to protect their wealth. For example, the recent highly
publicized case of Radmacher v. Granatino decided by the English Supreme Court involved an
agreement intended to protect Ms. Radmacher’s wealth. See Ian Cowie, Hedging Your Romantic Bets,
Daily Telegraph, Oct. 23, 2010, at 11. Britney Spears signed a premarital agreement with Kevin
Federline that eventually limited his financial claims in their divorce. See Jamie Doward, Prenuptial
Agreements
on
Rise
Amongst
Younger
Men,
Observer,
July
17,
2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/jul/18/prenuptial-agreements-rise-males.
John
Kerry signed a premarital agreement before he married Teresa Heinz. Id.
46. For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated: “Our research has disclosed that it is a
common practice to present antenuptial agreements at the eleventh hour before the wedding
ceremony.” See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1348 (Ohio 1994).
47. See, e.g., Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 815 (Ga. 2005); Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509,
511 (Tex. App. 2002); Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d. 522, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Liebelt
v. Liebelt, 801 P.2d. 52 (Idaho. App. 1990). See generally J.T. OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY (2010) § 4.03[4] nn.72 & 73..
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In some cases of this nature, courts have concluded the agreement was
involuntarily signed.48 For example, in Marriage of Rudder,49 the parties planned
to meet at the office of the husband’s lawyer the day before they were to leave
town to marry.50 The wife asked her prospective husband and his lawyer to be
sure that her long-time lawyer would also be present to give her advice.51 When
she arrived at the meeting, her lawyer was not there, apparently because neither
her husband nor his lawyer notified her lawyer of the meeting.52 The husband
gave the wife a draft of the agreement, which waived all marital rights and the
right to claim spousal support.53 The husband’s financial disclosure was general
and did not attempt to place a value on any of his assets.54 The husband
encouraged the wife to sign the agreement even though her lawyer had not
reviewed it or discussed it with her.55 She signed the agreement.56 The trial
court found the wife was relatively unsophisticated in financial matters.57 The
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the agreement was
involuntarily signed.58
In another case,59 the prospective bride quit her job, lost her housing, and
traveled from Russia to Montana intending to marry her fiancé.60 If she did not
marry him, she could not remain in the U.S.61 Shortly before the wedding, after
she had come to the U.S., the husband presented her with a premarital
agreement drafted by his lawyer.62 The husband hired a lawyer to talk to his
prospective wife, who did not understand much English, and the lawyer selected
did not speak Russian.63 The wife signed the agreement.64 The trial court found
that the prospective wife had quit her previous job and come to Montana
(bringing with her a child from a prior relationship) with “extremely limited
assets.”65 Her prospective husband stated he would not marry without a signed
premarital agreement.66 If she didn’t marry him, she would need to somehow
find the resources to return to Russia with her child and find a job and a place to

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See generally OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, supra note 47 at § 4.03[4] n.58.
217 P.3d 183 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 194.
In re Marriage of Shirilla, 89 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2004).
Id. at 2.
She had come to the U.S. on a “fiancée visa.” Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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live.67 The Montana Supreme Court found the negotiations coercive and upheld
a finding of involuntariness.68
In Kornegary v. Robinson,69 the parties became engaged in “early October”
1990 and decided to marry October 12.70 On October 11, the man told the
woman he wanted a premarital agreement.71 The day of the wedding, the parties
went to the office of the husband’s lawyer to review the agreement that had been
drafted.72 The woman was generally told that it limited her rights on divorce.73
She signed it without reading it or consulting a lawyer.74 The marriage ended
when the husband died.75 Contrary to what the wife was told, the agreement
limited her rights regardless of whether the marriage ended by death or
divorce.76 The trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of the husband’s
estate that the agreement was voluntarily signed and enforceable.77 The court of
appeals, however, noted that the wife had only a high school education and was
unsophisticated.78 In addition, the agreement was presented at the last minute,
the husband’s financial disclosure was incomplete, and the wife did not consult
with counsel.79 The court of appeals concluded that material issues of fact
existed regarding whether the agreement was voluntarily signed, so the
summary judgment motion ruling was reversed.80
A few other somewhat recent cases have declined to enforce an agreement
presented at the last minute. In one case, the agreement was presented on the
wedding day and the parties signed it in the church parking lot immediately
before the wedding.81 In another case, an agreement signed the day before the
wedding was not enforced.82 A third court held that an agreement was
involuntarily signed when it was presented and signed two days before the
wedding; the court emphasized the disparity in the parties’ respective ages,

67. Id.
68. Id. See also Azarova v. Schmitt, No. C-060090, 2007 WL 490908 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); A.E.S.
v. S.N.S., No. CN01-07370, 2006 WL 2389314 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2006); Chaplain v. Chaplain, 682 S.E.2d
108 (Va. Ct. App. 2009); Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
69. 625 S.E.2d 805 (N.C. App. Ct. 2006), rev’d, 637 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. 2006).
70. Kornegary, 625 S.E.2d at 806.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 807.
78. Id. at 808–09.
79. Id. at 809.
80. Id. at 810.
81. See Hoag v. Dick, 799 A.2d 391 (Me. 2002) (applying pre-UPAA case law to determine the
agreement was unenforceable). In Pember v. Shapiro, 794 N.W.2d 435 (N.D. 2011), the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed a finding of involuntary execution when the agreement was drafted and
signed hours before the wedding.
82. See Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming a finding of
undue influence). See also In re Marriage of Tamraz, 2005 WL 1524199 at *5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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sophistication, and bargaining power.83
Washington has applied a more robust procedural standard for enforceable
premarital agreements. In re Marriage of Bernard84 involved a prenuptial
agreement signed by a very rich man and a poor prospective bride.85 The man
gave the woman the first draft of the agreement about two weeks before the
wedding date.86 The woman met with a lawyer three days before the wedding,
apparently to go over the draft she had been given.87 That evening, her lawyer
received a substantially revised draft.88 The groom said he would call off the
wedding if she did not sign.89 The woman’s lawyer said it was very difficult to
contact his client in light of the many wedding details and guests she was
dealing with.90 She signed the agreement the day before the wedding.91 The
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the woman did
not sign the agreement “voluntarily or intelligently.”92
However, the above cases invalidating the premarital agreements seem to
be exceptions; in many instances, such agreements presented at the last minute
are found to be voluntarily signed.93 This result largely flows from how the issue
is framed—the agreement is perceived to be voluntarily signed unless the
proponent made an unlawful threat or the objecting party was forced to sign it.
This is a difficult standard to satisfy. For example, in Texas the UPAA has been
in effect for more than two decades, and in no appellate case so far has a
premarital agreement been considered involuntarily signed.
One recent example of this approach is In re Estate of Smid.94 In that case, the
husband was dying of cancer.95 During the week he eventually died, his son
from a prior marriage became concerned about his father’s lack of estate
planning, and he asked a lawyer to meet with his father.96 The lawyer met with
the husband and his wife and discussed his recommendation.97 The lawyer
prepared documents to transfer ownership of the husband’s property to a trust;
included was a waiver by the wife of her statutory rights as a surviving spouse.98
The lawyer delivered the documents to the parties’ home on January 29, 2003; he
did not explain the documents to the wife, apparently due to the understanding

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003).
204 P.3d 907 (Wash. 2009).
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 910.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 913.
See OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, supra note 47, at § 4.03[4] n.59.
756 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 2008).
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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he was representing the husband.99 The wife did not obtain legal advice before
she signed the documents that day.100 Later that evening, her husband died.101
Under South Dakota law, her waiver was not enforceable if involuntarily
signed.102 The wife admitted she was not “physically forced” to sign.103 Because
of this, and because the trial court found that her husband’s impending death did
not interfere with her ability to understand and comprehend events, the court
affirmed the finding of voluntary execution.104
Likewise, in Brown v. Brown,105 the wealthy party gave the other a draft of
the agreement a day before the wedding.106 That party tried to contact her
lawyer a few times that day but could not reach the lawyer.107 She then signed
the agreement.108
The court rejected the woman’s later claim that the
presentation of the agreement the day before the wedding, when preparations
for the wedding had already been made and out-of-town guests had already
arrived, at a time when obtaining legal advice was hampered by time constraints,
created a coercive atmosphere.109
Similarly, in the case In re Estate of Ingmand,110 the groom asked his lawyer to
prepare an agreement and, three days before the wedding, while telling his
prospective bride they were going to get a marriage license, the man drove her to
his lawyer’s office to review and sign the premarital agreement.111 The appellate
court affirmed the determination by the trial court that the agreement was valid,
noting that:
For [the male] to somehow trick [the female] into going to [the lawyer’s] office
just days before their marriage, and then condition the marriage on her
signature, was certainly not laudatory. However, while these actions may be
fairly characterized as surprise pressure tactics, they do not negate the knowing
and voluntary nature of the execution.112

Even if both parties have a lawyer, if a contract is presented at the last
minute the negotiations can be quite confusing and frantically conducted due to
the time pressure. For example, in the case In re Marriage of Murphy,113 the first
99. He apparently did discuss his general recommendations in the initial meeting. Id.
100. Id. at 5.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Id. at 14.
105. 26 So.3d 1210 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2007).
106. Id. at 1212.
107. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that the agreement contained a recital that
she had consulted with independent counsel before signing, so the trial court could reasonably
disbelieve the woman’s contention that she was not able to get legal advice. See 26 So.2d 1222 (Ala.
2009).
108. Brown, 26 So.3d at 1212.
109. Id. at 1215.
110. No. 08-1281, 2001 WL 855406 (Iowa App. Ct. July 31, 2001).
111. Id. at *1.
112. Id. at *3.
113. 834 N.E.2d 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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draft (written by the groom’s lawyer) was exchanged two days before the
wedding.114 The woman then contacted her lawyer and asked him to draft an
alternate agreement.115 Her lawyer advised her not to sign the initial draft
prepared by the man’s lawyer.116 On the day of the wedding, the man and
woman (but not her lawyer) went to the office of the man’s lawyer to discuss
changes to the draft his lawyer had prepared.117 After discussing some revisions,
the man gave her a copy of a revised agreement three hours before the wedding
was to begin.118 Without having her lawyer review the revised agreement, she
signed it.119 The appellate court affirmed the finding of the trial court that, while
the circumstances surrounding execution were certainly stressful, it was unlikely
a product of coercion or duress.120
In another case, weeks before the planned wedding, the groom said he
wanted the parties to sign a premarital agreement, and the woman said she
would consider one.121 The evening before the parties were to go to Las Vegas to
be married on New Year’s Eve, the man gave the woman a draft of a premarital
agreement and stated he would marry only if she signed.122 The trial court found
that the woman had no time to discuss the agreement with a lawyer or anyone
else due to the time the draft was first presented, so the trial court invalidated the
agreement based on undue influence and duress.123 Although the court of
appeals acknowledged the confidential relationship of people who are about to
marry, it held that “[t]he mere shortness of the time . . . between the presentation
of the premarital agreement and the date of the wedding is insufficient alone to
permit a finding of duress or undue influence;” further, “the shortness of the
time interval when combined with a threat to call off the marriage if the
agreement is not executed is likewise insufficient . . . to invalidate the
agreement.”124 Although the wife received the first draft of the agreement at 8:00
PM on December 30, with a planned wedding the next evening a substantial
distance away, the appellate court concluded that, “we cannot presume . . . that
the wife had insufficient time to . . . [consult] an attorney.”125
In DeLorean v. DeLorean,126 the court considered whether to enforce an
agreement presented by the husband “a few hours” before the wedding where
he stated that he would cancel the wedding if the prospective bride did not
sign.127 The agreement provided that all income and earnings of the parties
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 67.
Howell v. Landry, 386 S.E.2d 610, 612 (N.C. Ct. App.1989).
Id. at 612.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 618.
511 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
Id. at 1259.
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acquired before or during marriage would be exempt from equitable distribution
if the parties divorced.128 The woman did consult with a lawyer who had been
selected by the prospective husband to counsel her; the lawyer advised her not to
sign.129 After some period of indecision, the wife did sign the agreement before
the wedding.130 The court held that the agreement was voluntarily signed,
noting that the wife “had sufficient time to consider the consequences of signing
the agreement.”131
In another case, the party being asked to waive rights was given the
agreement two days before it was to be signed.132 She argued that was
overreaching.133 The appellate court stated that “two days . . . provided her
ample opportunity to seek the advice of counsel before signing,” and it affirmed
the ruling that the agreement should be enforced.134
Pajak v. Pajak135 also involved an agreement presented by a sophisticated
party to an unsophisticated party a day before the wedding.136 The court upheld
the agreement.137
Other courts have concluded that, despite the agreement being presented at
the last minute, the other party was not coerced into signing, so the agreement
was voluntarily signed.138 Some courts have sensibly considered whether,
despite the agreement being signed shortly before the wedding, the parties had
agreed to the material terms substantially earlier.139 However, if the parties have
only vaguely agreed to sign a premarital agreement without much clarity
regarding the precise terms of the agreement, it seems unfair to treat such an
agreement differently from any other agreement presented and negotiated
shortly before the wedding.140
ii. Duress
Many non-UPAA states will not enforce an agreement if “duress” is found
in connection with the negotiation and execution of the agreement. Duress is

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id..
132. Wiethe v. Beaty, No. CA98-04-049, 1999 WL 74595 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1999).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 385 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1989).
136. Id. at 385.
137. Id. at 389.
138. See Panossian v. Panossian, 172 A.D.2d 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (considering an agreement
signed two days before the wedding). Other cases have enforced agreements signed shortly before
the wedding. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1990); Estate of Cooper, 2011 WL
244 8979 (Miss. App.); Mann v. Mann, 2010 WL 1266677 at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2010).
139. See Lee v. Lee, 816 S.W.2d 625, 627–28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991).
140. Cf. Donovan v. Donovan, No. 159622, 1999 WL 1499141 (Va. Cir. Ct.) (making the
questionable argument that the objecting party was aware of the “basic parameters” of the agreement
to be presented).
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customarily defined as “improper and coercive conduct”141 that “destroys the
free agency of a party.”142 The case law regarding whether there was duress
sufficient to invalidate an agreement is similar to cases discussed above
involving whether an agreement was “voluntarily” signed.
Some courts have found duress in fairly extreme situations. For example, in
Holler v. Holler,143 the prospective wife moved from the Ukraine to marry a man
in South Carolina.144 She had a visa that would expire in three months unless she
married.145 A month after her arrival she became pregnant by her intended
husband.146 The groom then gave her a draft of a premarital agreement, which
was hard for her to understand because her English was not good.147 She did not
obtain legal advice before signing the document; they married shortly thereafter,
three days before her visa expired.148 She could remain in the U.S. only if she
married a U.S. citizen.149 Because the wife did not understand the agreement,
was pregnant, and did not want to return to the Ukraine, the court affirmed the
trial court’s finding of duress.150
Similarly, in Hjortaas v. McCabe,151 the man told the woman weeks before the
wedding that he wanted a premarital agreement.152 He provided a draft of an
agreement two or three days before the wedding, and the agreement was signed
the day before the wedding.153 No financial disclosure was exchanged.154 The
appellate court concluded that, because she only had “one day to seek
counsel . . . , to make an independent evaluation of the contract, or to cancel the
wedding,” her signature was the product of “unwarranted compulsion” and the
agreement should not be enforced.155
When an agreement waiving rights is presented at the last minute to a party
and that person is told that he or she has to sign it or the wedding will be
cancelled, the person waiving rights frequently contends that there was
substantial pressure to sign the agreement due to the presence of numerous
guests and family members and the embarrassment and expense that would
result from canceling the wedding. When considering the issue of duress,
although some courts have stated that this concern would be taken seriously if it

141. Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522, 524–25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
142. Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 474 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). See Howell v. Landry, 386 S.E.2d
610, 616 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Schrage v. Schrage, No. 2008-CA-002088-MR, 2009 WL 4882819 (Ky. Ct.
App.); Boote v. Shivers, 198 S.W.3d 732, 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
143. 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
144. Id. at 471.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 476.
151. 656 So.2d 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
152. Id. at 169.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 170.
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is a large wedding with many guests,156 most courts have ruled that, regardless
of whether it would have been difficult or embarrassing to cancel, the party
chose not to do so and was not forced to sign the agreement.157
When analyzing whether duress occurred when an agreement is signed
shortly before the wedding, some courts in non-UPAA states distinguish
between situations where the parties were negotiating the agreement for a
substantial period and those where the agreement is presented at the last
minute.158
A number of courts have found no duress when the agreement was
presented a day or two before the wedding.159 For example, in the case In re
Marriage of Yannalfo,160 the man presented the woman with a draft agreement one
day before the wedding and told her he would not marry unless she signed the
agreement.161 In their later divorce, the trial court invalidated the agreement
based on duress.162 The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the presentation of an agreement one day before the wedding is “insufficient to
support a finding of duress.”163
Likewise, in Fletcher v. Fletcher,164 the court affirmed a trial court finding of
no duress when the agreement was presented the day before the wedding.165
Similarly, in Williams v. Williams,166 the court affirmed a finding by the trial court
that there was no duress when a premarital agreement was presented and signed
a day before the wedding.167
156. Compare In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 350, 353 (N.H. 2003) (emphasizing the large
wedding as one factor justifying the ruling that the agreement was involuntarily signed), with
Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting the couple planned to
marry at the courthouse and that the wedding could have easily been postponed), Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1347 (Ohio 1994) (noting that the wedding could have been relatively easily
been postponed), In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 820 (Cal. 2000) (noting the wedding could have
easily been postponed), and Millstein v. Millstein, No. 80963,2002 WL 31031676 *8 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 12, 2002) (noting the wedding could have easily been postponed).
157. See Brown v. Brown, 26 So.3d 1210, 1217 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2007); DeLorean v. DeLorean,
511 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986).
158. See Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (containing a long
negotiation period); Boote v. Shivers, 198 S.W.3d 732 (Tenn. App. 2005) (containing a long negotiation
period); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990) (finding that the agreement had been negotiated
for a long period).
159. See Ware v. Ware, 7 So.3d 271, 276–77 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the waiving party
was not forced to sign the agreement presented two days before the wedding); Brown v. Brown, 26
So.3d 1210, 1217 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2007) (emphasizing the objecting party was a real estate agent
with experience negotiating contracts); Howell v. Landry, 386 S.E.2d 610, 614–15 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)
(finding that the objecting party “was not compelled by financial or other considerations to marry the
next day”); Hood v. Hood, 72 So.3d 666 (Ala. App. 2011).
160. In re Marriage of Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795 (N.H. 2002).
161. Id. at 796.
162. Id. at 797.
163. Id.
164. 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994).
165. Id. at 1348. The court concluded the wedding date could easily have been postponed. Id. at
1347.
166. 720 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. 1986).
167. The court emphasized that the waiving party had experience with contracts in her job. Id. at
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As stated above, there is a split of authority regarding whether presenting
an agreement a day or two before the wedding is duress.168 In contrast,
agreements presented more than a few days before the wedding are almost
always considered to have been negotiated without duress.169 An exception is
Eyster v. Pechenik,170 where the court stated that an agreement signed five days
before the wedding “raised questions” of duress.171
Regardless of whether the court is applying a standard of “involuntariness”
or “duress,” most courts have not found duress if a woman is pregnant and the
man offers to marry her only if she signs a premarital agreement.172
ii. Summary
The discussion above shows that, regardless of whether a state applies a
standard of involuntariness, duress, overreaching, coercion, or undue influence,
a significant number of courts have enforced premarital agreements proposed at
the last minute.
B. Disclosure of Financial Information
Under the UPAA, it is only relevant whether the waiving party received
adequate information from the other if the waiving party can also establish the
agreement was unconscionable when signed.173
Some “adopting” states
modified this provision to be consistent with the approach applied in almost all

248.
168. Compare Hjortaas v. McCabe, 656 So.2d 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), with In re Marriage of
Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795 (N.H. 2002), Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994) and Williams v.
Williams, 720 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. 1986).
169. See, e.g., Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that
the agreement was signed one hour before the ceremony, but the parties had been negotiating “for
months” and the waiving party had a lawyer); Millstein v. Millstein, No. 80963, 2002 WL 31031676 at
*7–8 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2012) (finding that eight days were sufficient); Gordon v. Gordon, 25
So.3d 615, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that ten days were sufficient); McKee-Johnson v.
Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 262 (finding that ten days were sufficient).
170. 887 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
171. Id. at 282.
172. See Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (finding no duress);
Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding no duress); In re Marriage
of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976) (finding no undue influence); Herrera v. Herrera, 895 So.2d 1171
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding no duress); Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. 2005) (finding no
duress); Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App. 2002) (finding the agreement was voluntarily
signed); Kilborn v. Kilborn, 628 So.2d 884 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (finding the agreement was
voluntary). But see Rowland v. Rowland, 599 N.E.2d 315 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Bassler v. Bassler, 593
A.2d 82 (Vt. 1991). In this regard, courts apparently have been more enthusiastic about enforcing
agreements than the drafting committee intended. When the UPAA was being debated, it was
suggested that an agreement would not be enforced under the UPAA if a young pregnant girl was
asked to sign a one-sided agreement as a condition of marriage. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, UNIFORM
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT 71–72 (1983).
173. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, §6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001). See Chaplain v.
Chaplain, 682 S.E.2d 108, 115 (Va. App. 2009) (finding that the challenging party was able to establish
both elements, which is rare in cases).
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other states, namely that insufficient knowledge of the other’s financial condition
at the time of signing should be an independent ground for invalidating an
agreement.174 For instance, in Minnesota premarital agreements are to be
enforced only if there was “full and fair disclosure of the earnings and property”
of each party.175
In most UPAA states, the disclosure requirement is satisfied by: (i)
disclosure, (ii) the party being aware of the information by other means, or (iii) a
waiver of the right to disclosure. Some states do not mention all three of these
ways of satisfying the requirement. For example, the Minnesota, Virginia, and
Connecticut statutes require disclosure.176 The Wisconsin and Iowa statutes do
not mention that the right to disclosure can be waived.177
There is widespread disagreement among states regarding the amount of
information needed to satisfy the disclosure requirement. For example, in
DeLorean v. DeLorean, the waiving party had extremely general knowledge of her
prospective husband’s finances.178 The agreement provided that the “[h]usband
is the owner of substantial real and personal property and he has reasonable
prospects of earning large sums of monies.”179 The wife apparently knew that
the husband had an interest in a farm in California, a large tract of land in
Montana, and a share of a major league baseball team.180 The court concluded
that this level of disclosure satisfied what it found to be the less demanding
standard applicable in California, but that it did not meet the more rigorous New
Jersey standard.181
As the DeLorean court noted, states are applying different standards
regarding financial disclosure requirements for premarital agreements.182 Most
states seem to agree that a precise disclosure of the value of all property is not
needed; a general and approximate knowledge appears sufficient.183 But what
does this mean in practice? In one case,184 the wealthy party did not disclose his
income.185 Was this material? The court held that it was not, at least in part
because the woman knew he was wealthy with significant income-producing
assets, and she had lived with him for four years before the agreement was

174. See supra Part II. B. iv.
175. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11 (West 2006).
176. See id.; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)–36(g) (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-151 (2008).
177. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.8 (West 2011).
178. 511 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
179. Id. at 1260.
180. Id.
181. The court enforced the agreement because it found California law should govern. Id.
182. See id.
183. See Robinson v. Robinson, 64 So.3d 1067 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010); Gordon v. Gordon, 25 So.3d
615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Brown v. Brown, 26 So.3d 1210 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); In re Estate of
Davis, 213 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Cannon v. Cannon, 865 A.2d 563 (Md. 2005); Millstein v.
Millstein, No. 80963, 2002 WL 310311676 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2002); Griffin v. Griffin, 94 P.3d 96
(Okla. Civ. App. 2004); Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996).
184. Dove v. Dove, 680 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 2009).
185. Id. at 843.
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signed.186 In Corbett v. Corbett,187 the same court held that, where the agreement
contained an alimony waiver and the objecting party was not otherwise aware of
the man’s income, the wealthy person’s nondisclosure of his income was
grounds for invalidating the agreement.188 In other cases, the nondisclosure of
significant premarital savings was sufficient to invalidate the agreement.189
Other cases consider whether it is sufficient that the objecting party knew
what the other party owned or whether an approximate value also needs to be
provided. The court in Gordon v. Gordon190 held that omitting the husband’s
rights to a pension plan from his disclosure statement did not invalidate the
agreement where the woman had a “general and approximate” knowledge of the
husband’s resources.191 In a North Dakota case, it was considered sufficient that
the waiving party knew her prospective husband “was worth a substantial
amount of money.”192 One court has concluded that, when parties marry early in
their adult life with few assets, a lack of disclosure of financial information
should not be grounds for invalidating an agreement.193 A number of courts
have held that the waiving party has adequate familiarity with the other party’s
financial situation if they dated a substantial period of time before the wedding
and thereby became knowledgeable of the other’s standard of living and
spending habits.194 In cases where the assets were identified but no values were
set forth, it could be important whether the assets would be easy to value (such
as publicly traded stocks) or the objecting party was familiar with the assets.195
Some states, including Tennessee, appear to require more detailed
disclosures.196 In In re Estate of Davis,197 the husband was aware when he signed
the agreement that the wife had a contract with a recording company and that

186. See id. See also Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 816 (Ga. 2005) (finding that the woman had
an awareness of the man’s “significant income.”); Smith v. Walsh-Smith, 66 A.D.3d 534, 535 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009) (finding disclosure of the wealthy party’s income was not needed where the other
party was fully aware of the financial disparity between the two parties); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 687
S.E.2d 421, 425 (Ga. 2009) (finding disclosure of the wealthy party’s income was not needed where
the other party was fully aware of the financial disparity between the two parties).
187. 628 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. 2006).
188. See id. Other courts have held the disclosure incomplete when the party’s income was not
disclosed. See Casto v. Casto, 508 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1987); Stemler v. Stemler, 36 So.3d 54 (Ala. Civ. App.
2009) (applying Florida law).
189. See Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48, 49–50 (Ga. 2005) (noting a $40,000 account); Blige
v. Blige, 656 S.E.2d 822, 825–26 (Ga. 2008) (noting $150,000 in hidden cash).
190. 25 So.3d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
191. Id. at 618.
192. Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594, 599 (N.D. 2004). See also, Brown v. Brown, 26 So.3d 1210
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (finding waiving spouse was aware the other party “was a millionaire”).
193. See Reed v. Reed, 693 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
194. See Winchester v. McCue, 882 A.2d 143, 147–48 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that the
waiving party was a lawyer who was represented by independent counsel.); Donovan v. Donovan,
No. 159622, 1999 WL 1499141 at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 28, 1999) (noting that the waiving party helped
the other maintain records of his various businesses).
195. See In re Estate of Reinsmidt, 897 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 687
S.E.2d 421 (Ga. 2009).
196. See In re Estate of Davis, 213 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
197. 213 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
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she owned some other property.198 The value of the properties was not
disclosed, and the court found that he was not otherwise aware of their value.199
Because the husband was not aware of the value of her properties, the agreement
was not enforced.200
In these types of cases in Tennessee, it may become determinative whether
the objecting spouse had independent counsel. In Reece v. Elliott,201 the issue was
similar to that presented in In re Estate of Davis.202 The disclosure document
listed various assets but did not list approximate values for all.203 The appellate
court affirmed the finding that the disclosure was adequate, noting that the
objecting party was represented by counsel and that she and her lawyer had the
opportunity to ask questions about the financial disclosure document.204
New Jersey also requires more detailed disclosure.205 The waiving party
must have “full awareness” of the income and assets of the other.206 In one case,
while the objecting party was aware that the other was a man of some wealth,
she had no idea what his net worth was when the agreement was signed, and the
agreement was not enforced.207 In Estate of Shinn208 the appellate court
invalidated the agreement when it found the proponent of the agreement failed
to disclose important assets.209
If disclosure is not made, the agreement will generally not be enforced210
unless the objecting party already was aware of the financial information. Also,
if the wealthy party materially misrepresents his net worth, this has been held to
be inadequate disclosure. For example, in one case, an agreement was
invalidated where a party represented in a premarital agreement that his net
worth was $473,000 but had a few months earlier in a loan application stated his
net worth was $1,341,000.211
If a party does attempt to place values on items of property, this presents
the issue of how accurate the values need to be. In one case, the wealthy party
disclosed that he had an ownership interest in a small business and listed the
value as about $2,000,000.212 A footnote stated this was the “book value” of the
stock and that the market value could be substantially higher.213 The court

198. Id. at 293–94.
199. Id. at 297–98.
200. Id. at 298.
201. 208 S.W.3d 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
202. See 213 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
203. Reece, 208 S.W.3d at 420.
204. Id. at 423.
205. See Marschall v. Marschall, 477 A.2d 833, 840 ( N.J. Super. Ct. 1984).
206. See id.
207. See Orgler v. Orgler, 568 A.2d 67 (N.J. 1989) (invalidating the agreement even though the
objecting party met briefly with a lawyer).
208. 925 A.2d 88 (N.J. App. Div. 2007).
209. Id. at 91.
210. See In re Marriage of Seewald, 22 P.3d 580, 585 (Colo. App. 2001).
211. See Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 644 N.W.2d 197 (N.D. 2002).
212. Gardner v. Gardner, 527 N.W.2d 701, 705–06 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
213. Id. at 705.
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rejected the waiving party’s later argument that providing book value and not
market value was misleading, at least in part because the waiving party had a
lawyer (who presumably could have requested more detailed financial
information).214
C. Independent Counsel
Although in many states it is important that parties have an opportunity to
consult with independent counsel if they so choose, in no state is consultation
with independent counsel a requirement for an enforceable premarital
agreement.215 The presence of independent counsel is a factor courts consider
when deciding questions of voluntary execution or the adequacy of financial
disclosure.216 The West Virginia Supreme Court recently announced that a
premarital agreement will be presumed valid only if both parties consulted with
independent counsel.217 In California, a restriction on spousal support is
permissible only if the waiving party consulted with independent counsel.218
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS
Premarital agreements contemplating divorce normally attempt to alter the
economic rights of the parties if they divorce. Some limit the rights of the less
wealthy spouse but still provide significant financial recovery to that spouse if
the marriage ends in divorce.219 But many severely restrict or attempt to
completely eliminate all financial claims upon divorce.220
States disagree regarding the extent to which the substantive fairness of an
agreement should impact its enforceability. Under the UPAA, substantive
fairness is relevant only if there is also inadequate financial disclosure.221 In
many non-UPAA states, an agreement may be challenged based upon unfairness

214. Id. at 706.
215. See Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 2004); Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 644 N.W.2d 197
(N.D. 2002); In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (2000); In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506
(Iowa 2008); Mabus v. Mabus, 890 So.2d 806 (Miss. 2003); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa.
1990); Donovan v. Donovan, No. 159622, 1999 WL 1499141 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 28, 1999); Panossian v.
Panossian, 172 A.D.2d 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.3d 90 (N.D. 1997);
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994); In re Estate of Kinney, 733 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 2007);
Brown v. Brown, 26 So.3d 1210 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). See generally OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION,
supra note 47, at § 4.03[5] nn.96, 99, & 104..
216. See, e.g., Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996); In re Estate of Smid, 756
N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 2008); In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1997); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d
1343 (Ohio 1994); Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); Edwards v. Edwards, 744
N.W.2d 243 (Neb. 2008); In re Estate of Kinney, 733 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 2007); Ansin v. Craven-Ansin,
929 N.E.2d 955, 963 n.9 (Mass. 2010). See generally OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, supra note 47, at §
4.03[5], n.97.
217. See Ware v. Ware, 687 S.E.2d 382, 390–91 (W.Va. 2009).
218. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2004).
219. See Jamie Doward, Divorce Deals: Wealthy, Young British Men Turn to Prenups, THE OBSERVER,
July 18, 2010 (describing the premarital agreement between Tom Cruise and Katie Holmes).
220. See id.
221. See supra Part II. B. iv. See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code § 4.006(a)(2).
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alone.222 Some states evaluate fairness at the time of signing and some at the
time of enforcement.223 A few consider whether the agreement is fair;224 most
consider whether it is unconscionable.225 Others ask whether the parties’
circumstances have changed in an unforeseeable way during the marriage.226
A. Unconscionability
In some states that adopted the bulk of the UPAA, an agreement can be
challenged solely based on the unconscionability of the agreement.
In
Wisconsin, Indiana, and Nevada, the focus is on unconscionability at time of
signing.227
Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Dakota consider
unconscionability at the time of enforcement.228 Other non-UPAA courts also
review for unconscionability at the time of divorce.229
Few statutes define what constitutes an unconscionable agreement. The
New Jersey statute provides that an agreement is unconscionable if it leaves a
party without a means of reasonable support or would provide a standard of
living for a party far below what the party enjoyed before the marriage.230
In states without statutory definitions, courts must clarify the characteristics
of an unconscionable agreement.
A few courts have stated that an
unconscionable agreement is one that is not “fair, reasonable and just.”231 Most
courts require a more substantial showing to find an agreement unconscionable.
One court noted that review of an agreement for unconscionability “is
substantially more circumscribed than review for mere inequity,”232 and courts
are to examine factors of “unfair surprise, notice, disparity of bargaining power,
and substantive unfairness.”233 Another court suggested that the primary focus
should be whether there was unfair surprise and the extent to which the
agreement is one-sided.234 Another perspective is that ”[u]nconscionability is the
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract
provisions, together with terms which are so oppressive that no reasonable
person would make [these provisions].”235 Other courts have characterized an

222. See OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION supra note 47, at § 4.03[3].
223. See supra Part II. B. i.
224. See DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002) (stating an agreement must be “fair
and reasonable” when signed).
225. See infra Part IV. A.
226. See id.
227. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58(6) (West 2009); IND. CODE 31-11-3-8 (LexisNexis 2007); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 123 A.080(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
228. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36g (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-37 (West 2011);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (2009).
229. See Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d
797 (Mass. 2002) (stating that an agreement must also be “fair and reasonable” when signed).
230. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-32.
231. See In re Marriage of Christen, 899 P.2d 339, 343 (Colo. App. 1995).
232. In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 514–15 (Iowa 2008).
233. Id.
234. See Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988).
235. See Holler v. Holler 612 S.E.2d 469, 476 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). See also Chaplain v. Chaplain,
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unconscionable agreement as one where the inequity is “strong, gross and
manifest,”236 the terms are “manifestly unfair and unreasonable,”237 or
enforcement of the agreement would “work an injustice.”238
But what do these terms mean in practice? In Gentry v. Gentry,239 the court
held that the agreement should not be enforced if a party would thereby be
unable to be self-supporting after divorce.240 Other courts have held that an
agreement should not be enforced if a party would become a public charge.241 A
third view is that the relevant inquiry looks to whether the parties’ circumstances
have changed in an unforeseeable way since the wedding.242 One court held an
agreement to be unconscionable where the waiving party had no assets and no
income.243
For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a postnuptial
agreement should not be enforced if it would be unconscionable at divorce to do
so. In Bedrick v. Bedrick,244 the parties signed a postnuptial agreement in 1977 and
amended it in 1989.245 The amended agreement limited the wife’s claims at
divorce to a payment of $75,000.246 In 2007, the wife filed for divorce.247 The
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the agreement
should not be enforced because doing so would work an injustice.248 The
Connecticut Supreme Court noted that “[u]nforeseen changes in the relationship,
such as having a child, loss of employment or moving to another state, may
render enforcement of an agreement unconscionable.”249 In this case, after the
agreement had been amended, the wife gave birth to a child and the husband’s
financial situation changed significantly.250
An alternative standard for reviewing a premarital agreement is that an
agreement should not be enforced if it would leave either party with a standard
of living far below that enjoyed before or during marriage.251 Another suggested
standard is that an agreement is not unconscionable at divorce if it does not
attempt to restrict spousal support.252 In evaluating the conscionability of an

682 S.E.2d 108, 113 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
236. McMullin v. McMullin, 926 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
237. Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
238. See Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 28 (Conn. 2011).
239. 789 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990).
240. See id. at 937 (Ky. 1990). See also Justus v. Justus, 581 N.E.2d 1265, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
241. See Bassler v. Bassler, 593 A.2d 82 (Vt. 1991); Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass.
1981); McFarlane v. Rich, 567 A.2d 585 (N.H. 1989).
242. See Blue, 60 S.W.3d at 589–90; Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577, 578 (Ky. 2006).
243. Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. 2005).
244. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 22 (Conn. 2011).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 21–22.
248. Id. at 29.
249. Id. at 28.
250. Id.
251. See Marschall v. Marschall, 477 A.2d 833, 840–41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984).
252. See Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594, 600 (N.D. 2004).
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agreement, some courts have considered whether the party waives all rights to
the possibility of a divisible marital estate.253
The terms of the agreement, the age of the parties, and their respective roles
during the marriage also can be relevant in determining unconscionability. In
Lane v. Lane,254 the court emphasized that the agreement involved both a waiver
of the right to divide a marital estate at divorce as well as the right to postdivorce maintenance.255 This court also suggested that agreements between
spouses marrying later in life were more likely to be upheld than agreements
between younger parties who had children together.256
Courts are not limited to choosing between fully enforcing or invalidating
an agreement. They might choose to enforce a portion and invalidate a portion.
In Lane, for example, both parties waived their rights to equitable distribution as
well as their rights to maintenance.257 During marriage, the husband’s career
prospered and the wife stayed home to take care of their young children.258 After
ten years of marriage, the husband filed for divorce.259 The trial court enforced
the waiver of equitable distribution but found that enforcement of the
maintenance waiver would be unconscionable, ordering the husband to pay
$12,000 monthly for three years.260 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that a
court may decide not to enforce some or all of a premarital agreement when at
the time of divorce circumstances had changed since the agreement was signed
so as to make enforcement unfair and unreasonable.261 The husband’s annual
earnings had increased during marriage from $166,000 to $1,000,000.262 The
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s holding that the waiver of the
right to equitable distribution should be enforced but the waiver of maintenance
should not.263 Similarly, a number of courts have proposed that waivers of the
right to equitable distribution should be presumptively valid, but if there is also
a waiver of spousal support the court should more aggressively review whether
the enforcement of a waiver of the right to support would be unfair.264
Likewise, in a recent New Jersey case, Rogers v. Gordon,265 the parties

253. See Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); In re Marriage of Thomas, 199
S.W.3d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
254. 202 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006).
255. Id. at 579–80.
256. Id. at 580.
257. Id. at 578.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 579.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 581.
264. See Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo.
1982). Lewis has been superseded by statute. In In re Marriage of Dechant, the court construed COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-2-307 (2011) as a codification of the Newman approach. 867 P.2d 193 (Colo. App.
1993),
265. 961 A.2d 11 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2008).
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married at a relatively young age with few assets.266 However, different career
trajectories seemed quite likely. The husband worked for the postal service
while the wife had graduated from Princeton and was planning to pursue an
MBA at the Wharton School.267 Their premarital agreement apparently included
waivers of the right to equitable distribution and the right to support.268 After a
twenty-four-year marriage, the wife was earning $578,000 annually and the
husband’s annual income of $63,000 seemed likely to decrease in the future.269
The appellate court enforced the waiver of a right to equitable distribution but
would permit spousal support if the husband would otherwise have a standard
of living lower than that enjoyed during marriage.270
Other courts have agreed that changes in the parties’ circumstances during
marriage should be more relevant to restrictions on spousal support than
waivers relating to equitable distribution.271 For example, the Colorado Supreme
Court proposed that, while equitable distribution waivers should not be subject
to a fairness review, a restriction on the right to spousal support could be
unconscionable and should not be enforced if it would leave a party after divorce
“without a means of reasonable support.”272 The Hawaii Supreme Court
proposed a similar approach.273
This approach was also applied in Gross v. Gross274 where the parties signed
a premarital agreement which waived the right to equitable distribution and
provided that, in the event of a divorce, the husband would pay the wife
monthly spousal support of $200 for ten years.275 The parties divorced twelve
years later when the husband’s net worth had quite substantially increased to
$6,000,000 and his income had also significantly increased.276 The court adopted
an approach similar to that applied by the Colorado Supreme Court in
Newman277: a waiver of the right to property division should not be subject to a
substantive fairness review, but a restriction on the right to spousal support can
become unconscionable if circumstances of the parties have significantly changed
during marriage.278 Here the court ruled that, in light of the substantial increase
in the husband’s wealth during marriage, it would be unconscionable to enforce
the maintenance restriction.279

266. See id. at 13.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 20.
269. Id. at 14.
270. Id. at 21.
271. See Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo.
1982).
272. Newman, 653 P.2d at 736.
273. Lewis, 748 P.2d at 1366–67.
274. 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984).
275. Id. at 503.
276. Id.
277. See Newman, 653 P.2d 728.
278. Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 509.
279. On remand, the wife was awarded monthly support in the amount of $2,500 for an
indefinite period. Gross, 492 N.E.2d 476 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). For an Ohio case finding an alimony
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B. Substantial and Unforeseen Change in Circumstances
In reviewing the fairness of an agreement at divorce, some courts have
decided that an agreement should not be enforced if the circumstances of the
parties changed during marriage in ways that were beyond the contemplation of
the parties when they married.280 In one case, the waiving party suffered years of
domestic violence during the marriage and the husband insisted she quit her job;
this was found to be an unforeseen change in circumstances.281 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has suggested that an unforeseen health problem or an
unplanned pregnancy could be an unforeseen change in circumstances that
would justify not enforcing the agreement.282 In many instances, however, the
change in the parties’ circumstances has been perceived to be foreseeable.
For example, in Winchester v. McCue,283 the parties filed for divorce after
fifteen years of marriage.284 Their premarital agreement apparently barred the
division of marital property or the award of spousal support.285 The husband’s
net worth was $1,223,000 when the marriage began and increased by more than
400% during marriage.286 The court found that this was not an “extraordinary
change in economic status” that was “so far beyond the contemplation of the
parties . . . as to make enforcement of the agreement work an injustice.”287
A similar outcome was reached in Crews v. Crews288 where the parties
divorced after seventeen years of marriage.289 The parties had raised children
together.290 The wife had been in a car accident, which limited her mobility.291
The premarital agreement apparently banned both equitable distribution of
property as well as the right to spousal support.292 The trial court concluded
that, because the value of the husband’s assets had greatly increased during
marriage and in light of the length of the marriage and the wife’s homemaking
contributions, the agreement should not be enforced.293 On appeal, the
Connecticut Supreme Court noted the approach taken in Winchester v. McCue
that an agreement should be considered unenforceable only upon a showing of

waiver not unconscionable, see Mann v. Mann, No. 09CA009685, 2010 WL 1266688 at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 5, 2010).
280. See, e.g., MacFarlane v. Rich, 567 A.2d 585 (N.H. 1989). See also Reed v. Reed, 265 Mich. App.
131, 693 N.W.2d 825 (2005); Mazzitelli v. Mazzitelli, 2005 WL 221683 (Minn. App.); Warren v. Warren,
147 Wis.2d 704, 433 N.W.2d 295 (1988); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1985).
281. See Hutchison v. Hutchison, No. 284259, 2009 WL 2244522 at *3–4 (Mich. Ct. App. July 28,
2009).
282. See Warren v. Warren, 433 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. 1988).
283. 882 A.2d 143 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
284. Id. at 146.
285. Id. at 145.
286. Id. at 145, 149.
287. Id. at 149 (quoting McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8, 12 (Conn. 1980)).
288. 989 A.2d 1060 (Conn. 2010).
289. Id. at 1062–63.
290. Id. at 1062.
291. Id. at 1063.
292. Id. at 1067–68.
293. Id. at 1070.
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an “extraordinary change in economic status.”294 The Supreme Court affirmed
the appellate court’s ruling that the changes in the parties’ circumstances were
consistent with the parties’ expectations when they married because the
premarital agreement contemplated that the parties would raise children
together.295
In a Georgia case involving a similar issue, the parties signed a premarital
agreement that barred the division of marital property and set forth a specified
formula for alimony.296 At the time of execution, the wife’s net worth was
$10,000 and the husband’s was $8,500,000.297 The parties had four children
during the marriage.298 After eighteen years of marriage, the husband, whose net
worth had increased to $22,700,000, filed for divorce.299 The trial court enforced
the agreement, whereby the wife was to receive $2,900 in monthly alimony for
four years.300 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling,
emphasizing that it was not unforeseeable that the husband’s assets would grow
in value significantly.301
A different conclusion was reached in Mazzitelli v. Mazzitelli.302 In this case,
the parties had contemplated having children when they married, but the wife
contended she had assumed she would take a short break from her career to
have a child and then resume her career.303 Instead, she stopped working
outside the home for almost ten years to raise the parties’ children.304 The
appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the agreement should
not be enforced based on the change in the parties’ circumstances.305
Finally, in a South Carolina case analyzing the foreseeability of changed
circumstances,306 the wife had various health problems when the parties
married.307 At the time of divorce, her health problems had become more severe
and she was totally disabled.308 The South Carolina Supreme Court found this
result foreseeable and enforced the agreement.309
294. Winchester v. McCue, 882 A.2d 143 at 149.
295. Crews, 989 A.2d at 1071–72. Reed v. Reed is another case involving a long marriage where the
parties had signed a premarital agreement and the appellate court ruled that it was foreseeable that
over the course of a marriage of twenty-six years each party might accumulate substantially different
amounts of assets, so the agreement was enforced. 693 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
296. Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Ga. 2005).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See also Reed v. Reed, 693 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a substantial
increase in value of a party’s assets during a lengthy marriage was foreseeable).
302. 2005 WL 221683 (Minn. App. 2005).
303. Id. at *2.
304. Id.
305. Id. at *3. See also Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 (Conn. 2011) (holding that the parties’
marital agreement was unconscionable due to changed circumstances).
306. Hardee v. Hardee, 585 S.E.2d 501 (S.C. 2003).
307. Id. at 502.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 505.

Oldham_Paginated (Do Not Delete)

110 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

3/13/2012 10:20 AM

Volume 19:83 2011

Within the past decade, while a few courts have invalidated an agreement
based on changed circumstances, a number of courts have ruled that various
changes in the circumstances of the parties, regardless of whether they were
substantial, were foreseeable at the time of execution and therefore were not
grounds for invalidating the agreement.
C. Restrictions Upon the Right to Spousal Support
Under the UPAA, spousal support waivers generally are enforced unless
the waiving party would become a public charge after divorce.310 Furthermore, a
few non-UPAA states have enforced a spousal support waiver even when the
waiving spouse would become a public charge if it was foreseeable that this
could occur when the agreement was signed.311
In contrast, some states do not permit a restriction of the right to spousal
support in a premarital agreement.312 In other states, courts sometimes have
found a waiver of the right to spousal support to be unconscionable at the time
of divorce and therefore unenforceable.313
For example, one court stated that a contractual restriction on alimony
should not be enforced if the waiving party will not be able to provide for his or
her reasonable post-divorce needs.314 Another view is that, if the waiving party
would thereby experience a substantial change in circumstances from the marital
standard of living after divorce, the agreement should not be enforced.315 A few
states have adopted a rule that a contractual restriction of spousal support
should not be enforced if it would be unconscionable to do so.316 The Illinois
statute provides that if a contractual restriction on the right to spousal support
would cause a spouse “undue hardship in light of circumstances not reasonably
foreseeable at the time of execution[,] . . . a court . . . may require the other party
to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid such hardship.”317 In one
Illinois case, the parties were married for eight years and had no children.318 The
parties’ incomes at divorce were very different.319 The parties, represented by
independent counsel, had signed a premarital agreement containing a waiver of

310. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, §6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001). See also, Cron v. Cron, 8
A.D.3d 186 (App. Div. 2004).
311. See Hardee v. Hardee, 585 S.E.2d 501, 505 (S.C. 2003); Baker v. Baker, 622 So.2d 541, 543–44
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
312. See supra Part II. B. 3.
313. See DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002) (stating that spousal support
waivers would not be enforced).
314. See In re Marriage of Dechant, 867 P.2d 193 (Colo. App. 1993).
315. See Rogers v. Gordon, 961 A.2d 11, 20–21 ( N.J. Super. Ct. 2008); Warren v. Warren, 523 N.E.
680, 683 (1988) (stating that a total waiver of maintenance was not fair or reasonable); Upham v.
Upham, 630 N.E.2d 307, 310–11 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that a complete waiver of maintenance
was not fair or reasonable).
316. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-307(2) (West 2011); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2004).
317. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(b) (West 2009).
318. In re Marriage of Barnes, 755 N.E.2d 522, (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
319. See id. at 524.
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spousal support.320 The court found that a transition from a “lifestyle of luxury”
to a $24,000 annual salary after divorce was not an undue hardship.321
Likewise, in Indiana, if a contractual restriction on the right to spousal
maintenance causes “extreme hardship under circumstances not reasonably
foreseeable at the time of execution[,] . . . a court . . . may require the other party
to provide spousal maintenance to the extent necessary to avoid extreme
hardship.”322 In one Indiana case, the parties were married for four years and
had no children.323 Before they married, they signed a premarital agreement
waiving, among other things, a claim for maintenance.324 In this case there was
testimony that the husband’s annual income exceeded $200,000, that the wife
was “never allowed to work after [marriage],” and that, after the separation, the
wife was then earning twenty-five dollars per hour.325 Here, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the enforcement of the maintenance waiver
would present an extreme hardship to the wife.326
V. A COMPARATIVE VIEW
A. England
England has not passed legislation clarifying when marital agreements
contemplating divorce will be enforced. However, recent judicial decisions have
changed the ground rules so it now appears more likely that such agreements
will be enforced.
MacLeod v. MacLeod327 involved an American couple who married in
Florida.328 They moved to the Isle of Man where they signed a postnuptial
agreement.329 Both parties had independent counsel.330 In their later divorce, the
English appellate court held that postnuptial agreements generally should be
enforced unless a change in the parties’ circumstances would make enforcement
of the contract “manifestly unjust.”331
A 2010 case appears to accept the validity of prenuptial agreements.332 In
Radmacher v. Granatino,333 the English Supreme Court announced the principle
that prenuptial agreements should be enforced if they are fair.334 The English
320. Id.
321. See id.
322. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-3-8(b) (LexisNexis 2007).
323. VanWagner v. VanWagner, 868 N.E.2d 924 (Table), No. 10A04-0606-CV-342, 2007 WL
1775555 at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
324. Id. at *2.
325. Id. at *3.
326. See id.
327. (2008) UKPC 64 (Eng.).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. See generally Jo Miles, Agreements for Grown-ups?, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 285 (2009).
332. See Radmacher v. Granatino, [2010] UKSC 42 (Eng.).
333. [2010] UKSC 42 (Eng.).
334. See Andrew Meehan, Radmacher in the Supreme Court: What Does It All Mean? 40 FAM. LAW
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court then set forth some general guidelines regarding when premarital
agreements should be enforced.335 In terms of procedural requirements, the
court stated that an enforceable agreement was one entered into without undue
influence where the parties were informed of its implications.336 Regarding
substantive fairness, the court outlined that trial courts should consider whether
the parties’ circumstances had changed in unforeseen ways since the agreement
was signed.337
The recent English decisions make it more likely marital agreements will be
enforced in English divorces but do not clarify in great detail when equitable
concerns will cause courts to invalidate agreements.
B. New Zealand
New Zealand has a statute dealing with the enforcement of premarital
agreements.338 What might be most surprising to American readers is that,
among other formalities, to create an enforceable agreement each party must
receive independent legal advice.339 In addition, an agreement can be set aside if
enforcement would cause a “serious injustice,”340 a higher standard than mere
unfairness.341 In deciding whether there would be a serious injustice, the statute
directs courts to consider, among other things, the length of time since the
agreement was made, whether the agreement was unfair or unreasonable when
signed, and whether the agreement has become unfair or unreasonable in light of
changes in circumstances since the date of execution.342
C. Australia
Australia has also legislated standards for prenuptial agreements
contemplating divorce. Like New Zealand, the original statute, adopted in 2000,
mandated independent representation as a precondition for an enforceable
agreement.343 Such agreements may address both property division and spousal

1284 (2010); David Hodson, English Marital Agreements for International Families after Radmacher, 2011
INT’L FAM. LAW 31 (2011); Julia Werdigier, Supreme Court in Britain Gives More Legal Force to Prenuptial
Agreements, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/
world/europe/21divorce.html.
335. Id.
336. See Nina Dethloff, Contracting in Family Law: A European Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF
FAMILY PROPERTY IN EUROPE 65, 73 (Katharina Boele-Woelki, Jo Miles & Jens Scherpe eds. 2011).
337. Id. See also Hayley Trim, Radmacher v. Granatino: The Wait is Over, 40 FAM. LAW 1185
(2010). For a discussion of English law regarding premarital agreements before McLeod and
Radmacher, see Nigel Lowe & Roger Kay, The Status of Prenuptial Agreements in English Law –
Eccentricity or Sensible Pragmatism?, in FAMILY FINANCES 395 (Bea Verschraegen ed. 2009).
338. See Bill Atkin & Wendy Parker, RELATIONSHIP PROPERTY IN NEW ZEALAND 193 (2d. ed. 2009)
(discussing § 21F of the Property (Relationships) Act of 1976).
339. See id.
340. Id. at 194 (discussing § 21J of the Property (Relationships) Act of 1976).
341. Id. at 196.
342. Id.
343. See Belinda Fehlberg & Bruce Smyth, Binding Pre-nuptial Agreements in Australia: The First
Year, 16 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 127, 128, 130–31 (2002).
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maintenance.344 Enforcement can be avoided, however, if circumstances change
during marriage so that enforcement would be “impracticable.”345 Another
ground for avoiding an agreement is unconscionable conduct.346 Maintenance
restrictions are not enforced if a party would thereby qualify for a government
benefit.347 An agreement can also be set aside due to fraud.348 If the agreement
was executed under coercive circumstances, the agreement may be
invalidated.349
Certain amendments were made to Australian premarital agreement rules,
effective in January 2010. The most important of these gives a court the right to
enforce an agreement if “it would be unjust and inequitable” not to enforce it,
even if certain procedural requirements, such as the receipt of independent legal
advice, were not followed.350 However, courts are given no guidance about how
to make the determination whether it would be “unjust and inequitable” not to
enforce the agreement.351
D. Canada
In Canada premarital agreements contemplating the economic
consequences of divorce are generally valid.352 These agreements are regulated
by provincial law, not federal law.353 Some provincial laws provide grounds to
invalidate such agreements. In Ontario, Canada’s largest province, premarital
agreements may not impact rights in the matrimonial home.354 Enforcement of
an agreement can be avoided if a party failed to disclose significant assets at the
time of execution355 or if the waiving party did not understand the nature and
consequences of the contract.356 Prior to signing an agreement, the parties must
disclose their assets as well as the value of those assets.357 In one case, the
agreement was not enforced where the wealthy spouse did not accurately
disclose the value of his assets and encouraged the other party to fire her
344. Id. at 129–30.
345. Id. at 131; Patrick Parkinson, Setting Aside Financial Agreements, 15 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 26, 45
(2001).
346. See Parkinson, supra note 345, at 48.
347. See Owen Jessep, Section 90G and Pt. VIIIA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), 24 AUSTL. J. FAM.
L. 104, 105 (2010).
348. See Blackmore & Webber (2009) FMCA Fam. 154 (noting that, where the husband’s
nondisclosure of financial information was found to be fraud,the agreement was not enforced); Grant
& Grant-Lovett (2010) FMCA Fam. 162 (noting that, where the husband’s nondisclosure of financial
information was found to be fraud, the agreement was not enforced).
349. See Blackmore & Webber, supra note 348.
350. See Jessep, supra note 347, at 110–13.
351. Id.
352. See Stephen Grant, Prenuptial Agreements in Canada: The Exceptions Make the Rules, in
INTERNATIONAL PRE-NUPTIAL AND POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENTS 101, 101 (Family Law 2011).
353. See id.
354. See HUGH STARK & KIRSTIE MACLISE, DOMESTIC CONTRACTS (Thomson Reuters Canada)
(discussing § 52 of the Ontario Family Law Act).
355. Id. (discussing § 56(4) of the Family Law Act).
356. Id.
357. Id. (citing Dubin v. Dubin, 34 R.F.L. (5th) 227 (Ont. S.C.J.)).
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aggressive and zealous lawyer and instead hire another more compliant lawyer
at the last minute.358 Under Ontario law, the waiving party must “understand
the nature and consequences” of the agreement for it to be enforceable.359
Although consultation with independent counsel is not expressly required,
obtaining independent legal counsel is the best way of satisfying this
requirement.360 A waiver of spousal support is not enforceable if it would cause
“unconscionable circumstances.”361
In British Columbia, legislation gives a court discretion to not enforce the
property provisions of a contract if it is “unfair” at divorce.362 In one case, a
pregnant woman signed a premarital agreement on her wedding day that
waived most of her rights to division of marital property.363 She had
independent legal advice, the groom fully disclosed the extent of his assets, and
there was no attempt to restrict spousal support.364 In spite of the wife’s claim
that her pregnancy and the timing of her signing of the premarital agreement
made it unfair, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the agreement.365
Restrictions on the right to spousal support are more closely reviewed for
unfairness.366
E. Western Europe
In many Western European countries, the default marital regime for
spouses is one of community property of acquests.367 Spouses normally retain
the right to select another regime such as separation of property.368 Under that
alternative, there is no sharing of property either during or at the end of
marriage.369 To choose an alternate regime, spouses must sign a written
agreement before marriage; prior to doing so, most countries require they meet
with a notary who explains to both parties the impact of the agreement.370 In

358. See Nicholas Bala, Case Comment on LeVan v. LeVan: Over-Reaching in the Formation of a Prenuptial Contract, 32 R.F.L. (6th) 374 (2007).
359. Id.
360. Id. Another commentator has said that it would be a “rare case” where an agreement would
be enforced in Ontario if both parties did not have independent counsel. See Grant, supra note 352, at
105–06. In Alberta and New Brunswick, legislation expressly provides that a premarital agreement is
enforceable only if both parties have independent legal counsel. See id. at 105 n.18.
361. See id. at 106–07.
362. Id.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. Id. See also Martha Shaffer, Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme Court’s Decision in
Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 20 CAN. J. FAM. L. 261 (2004).
366. See Bala, supra note 358.
367. See generally FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE (Carolyn Hamilton & Alison Perry eds., 2d ed. 2002).
This type of community property system is the one accepted in the United States. As a general rule,
parties jointly own property accumulated by either spouse during marriage due to effort, while they
do not share premarriage acquisitions by either spouse or a gift or inheritance received by either
spouse during marriage. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
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some countries, parties may not restrict post-divorce spousal support in a
premarital agreement.371
Although some countries permit marital contracts selecting a regime of
separate property to be challenged at divorce on the ground of unfairness,372 in
most countries such a selection will be enforced at divorce.373 A few countries
have created a system of compensatory payments after divorce that cannot be
limited by a premarital agreement.374 Provisions restricting the right to spousal
support, where permitted, are scrutinized more rigorously for fairness.375
F. Summary
In many jurisdictions outside the United States, to make an enforceable
premarital agreement both parties must consult with independent counsel or a
civil law notary. In most, there are significant restrictions on the right to limit
post-divorce support or there is judicial review of the agreement at the time of
divorce to see whether enforcement would impose an undue hardship on either
party.
VI. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE UPAA
A. Procedural Revisions
i. Clarifying What Constitutes Voluntary Execution
Many United States courts now let the wealthy party “sandbag” the other in
premarital agreement negotiations, allowing the party in favor of the agreement
to wait until a day or two before the wedding to present a draft of a premarital
agreement.376 This forces the less sophisticated party, at the last minute, to try to
locate a lawyer and decide whether to sign the agreement or cancel the wedding.
This is hugely unfair, wrong, and cries out for change.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has been critical of such bargaining
strategies. In re Estate of Hollett,377 for example, involved a wealthy spouse who
mentioned the possibility of a premarital agreement two years before the
eventual wedding date.378 The poorer spouse strongly objected, and the spouse

371. See Nina Dethloff, Arguments for the Unification and Harmonization of Family Law in Europe, in
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND HARMONIZATION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 50 n.74
(Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., 2003) (referring to Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). See also
Dethloff, Contracting in Family Law, supra note 336, at 82 n.122 (mentioning also Belgium, Denmark,
Poland and Portugal).
372. See Dethloff, Arguments for the Unification and Harmonization of Family Law in Europe, supra
note 371, at § 2.3.4.
373. Id.
374. Id. at § 2.4 (mentioning France as an example).
375. Id.
376. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795 (N.H. 2002); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628
N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994); Williams v. Williams, 720 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. 1986).
377. 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003).
378. Id. at 350.
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arguing for the agreement said nothing further.379 In holding the agreement
invalid, the court stated:
[A]lthough John’s lawyers had drafted a prenuptial agreement almost a month
before the wedding, John did not obtain counsel for his wife or even inform her
of the agreement until several days before the ceremony. In other words, despite
having every opportunity to negotiate the agreement well before the wedding,
John elected to conduct his affairs so that Erin had no time to choose her own
counsel, and very little time to negotiate and reflect upon the agreement.380

As discussed above, courts often analyze the issue of whether an agreement
was voluntary signed by asking whether the spouse being asked to waive rights
was compelled to sign the agreement.381 Because of this focus, many courts have
held that an agreement should not be invalidated based on the fact that it was
presented at the last minute.382
I would submit this is the wrong focus. Perhaps it is necessary to reframe
the issue. The proposed model statute383 states that an agreement should not be
enforced if the circumstances surrounding execution placed “undue pressure” on
the party being asked to waive rights.384 Such a revision of the standard would
clarify that the issue is not “voluntariness” as that concept has been framed by
most courts but whether the bargaining process was consistent with the
confidential relationship that exists between prospective spouses. Did the
spouse being asked to waive rights have a reasonable opportunity to decide
whether to consult with independent counsel? Did that party have adequate
time to consider any legal advice obtained? Did that spouse have a reasonable
amount of time to decide whether to sign the agreement before the distractions
and pressures of an impending wedding became overwhelming? In contrast,
many courts today apply a much lower standard of review, upholding
agreements even where unfair bargaining has occurred. For example, in Estate of
Ingmand,385 the court enforced the agreement despite the fact that it found one
party had “tricked” the other and employed “surprise pressure tactics.”386
Numerous courts have recognized that engaged people have a confidential
or fiduciary relationship.387 As the Washington Supreme Court observed:

379. Id.
380. Id. at 353.
381. Supra Part I. B. i.
382. See In re Marriage of Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795, 797–98 (N.H. 2002); Howell v. Landry, 386
S.E.2d 610, 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
383. See infra Schedule A.
384. See id.
385. No. 00-1281, 2001 WL 855406 (Iowa Ct. App. July 31, 2001).
386. Id. at *3.
387. See Sogg v. Nevada State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 784 (Nev. 1992); Cannon v. Cannon, 865 A.2d
563, 573 (Md. Ct. App. 2005); Griffin v. Griffin, 94 P.3d 96, 99–100 (2004); In re Estate of Hollett, 834
A.2d 348, 351 (N.H. 2003); In re Marriage of Drag, 762 N.E.2d 1111, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Wiley v.
Iverson, 985 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Mont. 1999); Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 821 (Tenn. 1996);
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1346 (Ohio 1994); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 449 S.E.2d 502, 504
(Va. Ct. App. 1994); Pajak v. Pajak, 385 S.E.2d 384, 389 (W. Va. 1989); Tiryakian v. Tiryakian, 370
S.E.2d 852, 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Mass. 1979); Merrill
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Parties to a pre-nuptial agreement do not deal with each other at arm’s length.
Their relationship is one of mutual confidence and trust which calls for the
exercise of good faith, candor and sincerity in all matters bearing upon the
proposed agreement. The basic objective of this common sense rule is to prevent
overreaching.388

Premarital agreements should not be governed by contract rules applicable
to commercial contracts. The relationship of parties planning to marry in the
near future is much more complex and, as the past forty years of premarital
agreement bargaining and litigation have shown, a party may need additional
protection from abusive bargaining tactics. For example, in California one
spouse is barred from taking “unfair advantage” of the other.389 If the focus were
shifted from voluntariness to undue pressure, such a standard would be more in
keeping with the confidential relationship of the parties and would reduce the
ability of one spouse to take unfair advantage of the other.
A new standard for premarital agreement bargaining could be implemented
in the form of a general rule. For example, a statute could be enacted requiring
that a premarital agreement be presented a sufficient time before the wedding so
the party to whom the agreement is presented will have adequate time, without
being placed under undue pressure, to: (i) consider whether to consult an
attorney; (ii) locate and consult with independent counsel, if legal advice is
desired; and (iii) decide whether to sign the agreement. Such a general standard
would give courts some flexibility in applying the rule to different situations.
However, it could present some problems. First, some courts might
construe such a general statute as not changing existing standards for
determining whether to enforce a premarital agreement. Second, if the statute
would be construed as changing existing standards, it would not be clear to
parties what is required until case law developed clarifying the rule. I propose
that a clear set of minimum bargaining rules would therefore be preferable.
U.S. law has long recognized that, even absent a confidential relationship, a
party can be pressured into signing an agreement, and the agreement therefore
should not be considered binding. For example, consumer protection laws
sometimes give a party to such an agreement three to seven days to rescind the
agreement.390 Of course, it would not be fair to allow a party to sign a premarital
v. Estate of Merrill, 552 P.2d 249, 250 (Or. 1976); Fick v. Fick, 851 P.2d 445, 449-450 (Nev. 1993);
Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 732 (Colo. 1982); Watson v. Watson, 126 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ill.
1955); In re Broadie’s Estate, 493 P.2d 289, 293 (Kan. 1972); Hartz v. Hartz, 234 A.2d 865, 870 (Md.
1967); In re Estate of Strickland, 149 N.W.2d 344, 351 (Neb. 1967); In re Estate of Serbus, 324 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 1982); Braddock v. Braddock, 542 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Nev. 1975); Kosik v. George, 452
P.2d 560, 563 (Or. 1969); In re Estate of Hillegass, 244 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. 1968); Hook v. Hook, 431
N.E.2d 667, 669 (Ohio 1982).
388. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (Wash. 1972) (en banc).
389. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (West 2004). See, e.g., In re Marriage of Balcof, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
390. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.6(b) (West 2011) (stating that a buyer has a seven-day right to
cancel a home solicitation contract for a personal emergency response unit); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
9-A, § 3-502(1-A) (2009) (stating that a buyer has a ten-day right to cancel a home food service plan);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-02(1) (stating that a buyer older than sixty-four has fifteen days to cancel a
home solicitation contract); FLA. R. CT. 12.740(f)(1) (2011) (stating that counsel not present at a
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agreement the day of the wedding, marry, and then rescind the agreement a few
days after the wedding. Another way to reduce the likelihood that a prospective
spouse will agree to an oppressive premarital agreement as a result of lastminute pressure is to slow down the negotiations. Requiring a “cooling-off
period” would allow the party to whom the agreement is presented to consider
whether to retain counsel or ask for modifications to the agreement, as well as
whether to refuse to sign it.391
California has already adopted one type of cooling-off period for premarital
agreements.392 The statute provides that an agreement will be considered
voluntarily signed only if, among other things, at least seven days passed
between the day the final version of the agreement was presented and when it
was signed.393 The appropriate amount of time for such a cooling-off period is
debatable; seven days certainly is better than nothing, but it may be difficult,
particularly for relatively unsophisticated parties, to find a lawyer within seven
days.
My proposal is not identical to California’s waiting period requirement,
which has been construed to require a seven-day waiting period after the
agreement is finalized.394 In contrast, my proposal only requires that the agreement
not be signed until seven days after the first draft is presented; the parties would
be free to negotiate and make revisions during that period.395
Also, the California provision has been construed to apply only if a party is
not represented by counsel.396 The waiting period I propose would apply to both
represented and unrepresented parties.397 The primary purpose of this proposal
is to make it impossible for the agreement to be signed without giving the party
to whom the agreement is presented a period of time to consider whether to sign
the agreement, consult an attorney, or request changes in the agreement.398 It is
true that such a waiting period is not normally required before parties can make
an enforceable agreement; however, in light of the confidential relationship that
exists between an engaged couple and the history of abusive bargaining that has
recently become common, such a waiting period is a desirable and necessary
precaution.
In addition to the waiting period requirement, other safeguards are needed.
The ALI has proposed that, to give rise to a presumption that the agreement was
voluntarily signed, the agreement must be signed by both parties at least thirty

mediation may cancel a mediated settlement agreement within ten days); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-14703(a) (2003) (stating that a buyer of a camping site time share has five days to cancel).
391. See generally Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1238 (2003) (discussing the benefits of a
cooling-off period in certain situations).
392. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c) (West 2004).
393. Id.
394. See In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso and Faso, 2011 WL 72179 at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11,
2011).
395. See infra Schedule A.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
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days before the wedding.399 This requirement would deter last minute
bargaining and encourage prospective spouses to finalize such agreements
before the frenzy of the wedding weekend. A similar rule of thumb—that
premarital agreements should be signed at least a month before the wedding—
appears to be evolving in England.400
Although it would certainly be wise to finalize such agreements long before
the wedding date, a question remains: if a black letter rule is to be established,
what should be the cut-off date? Given the common practice of last-minute
bargaining in the U.S., a change to thirty days before the wedding may be too
drastic to try to impose at this time. My proposed statute provides that
agreements generally must be finalized and signed seven days before the
wedding.401 (A rebuttable presumption of undue pressure arises if the
agreement is signed within seven days of the wedding.402) Although some might
prefer the ALI’s suggested time period of thirty days, if this more modest
proposal of seven days were accepted it would significantly improve the fairness
of premarital agreement bargaining in the U.S. while not being too inconvenient
for the parties.
It is not unheard of to require that a contract be signed a certain number of
days before an important event that could catalyze a significant amount of
emotion. For example, Texas has adopted a set of rules for drafting an
enforceable surrogacy agreement.403 The statute requires, among other things,
that the agreement be signed at least fourteen days before the embryo is
implanted in the gestational mother.404 Among other things, this fourteen-day
requirement gives the woman at least two weeks to change her mind after
signing the agreement but before the process is begun.
So, I would propose that, to improve the bargaining process for premarital
agreements, as a general rule: (i) the agreement cannot be signed until a specified
number of days have elapsed after a draft agreement is first presented, and (ii)
the final agreement generally must be signed by both parties a specified number
of days before the wedding. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has stated that
“[i]ndependent counsel is useless without the ability and the time to make
effective use of such counsel.”405 This proposed rule attempts to ensure that the
party being asked to waive rights has adequate time to locate and consult
independent counsel.
The ALI Principles provide that, if the circumstances surrounding execution
do not meet the standards set forth in Section 7.04(3) (such as being signed at

399.

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
(2002) (hereinafter “ALI PRINCIPLES”) § 7.04(3).
400. See Romantic Small Print: England’s Supreme Court Upholds Prenuptial Agreements, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17311887.
401. See infra Schedule A.
402. Id.
403. See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 160.754(e) (Vernon 2011).
404. See id.
405. In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 353 (N.H. 2003).
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least thirty days before the wedding), no presumption arises regarding duress.406
Given how courts have dealt with this problem in the past, the statute should be
drafted such that the agreement is presumed unenforceable if the circumstances
surrounding execution do not meet the requirements discussed above regarding
a minimum time to deliberate and signing at least a certain number of days
before the wedding. If the circumstances surrounding execution do meet the
standards set forth, the agreement would be presumed valid. Agreements that
do not meet these standards presumptively should not be enforced except in
those instances where parties have already informally reached an agreement
regarding all material terms weeks before the wedding and memorialize it
within two days of the wedding407 or where the negotiations have been
continuing for a significant period and the agreement is finally signed within two
days of the wedding.
Gardner v. Gardner408 serves as an example where an agreement signed fewer
than seven days before the wedding should be enforced. In Gardner the party
being asked to waive rights had a lawyer and received the initial draft of the
agreement more than two months before the wedding.409 The parties exchanged
proposed drafts and signed the final agreement three days before the wedding.410
In addition, my proposal creates a conclusive presumption of undue
pressure if the agreement is signed within forty-eight hours of the wedding.411
This would be true regardless of the sophistication of the parties or the presence
of independent counsel.
An example of how this rule would affect current law can be seen by
considering Winchester v. McCue.412 In this case, the first draft was provided
seven days before the wedding, seven drafts were exchanged, and the parties
signed the final agreement hours before the wedding.413 The waiving party was
a lawyer who had independent counsel.414 Under the proposed schedule, a
conclusive presumption of undue pressure would exist.
The most significant impact of the acceptance of the bargaining rules I have
proposed is that it is unlikely an agreement first presented fewer than fourteen
days before the wedding will be enforced. Agreements first presented a few
days before the wedding would almost never be enforced.

406. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 399, at 964–65.
407. As Brian Bix has noted, there could be a muddy distinction between situations where parties
have discussed a premarital agreement and situations where they have agreed to all material terms. See
Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think
About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 188 (1998).
408. 527 N.W.2d 701 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
409. Id. at 705–06.
410. See also Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Robinson v.
Robinson, 64 So.3d 1067 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
411. See infra Schedule A.
412. 882 A.2d 143 (Conn. Ct. App. 2005).
413. Id. at 145.
414. Id.
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ii. Disclosure of Financial Information
Under the UPAA, inadequate disclosure of financial information is grounds
for invalidating an agreement only if: (i) the party did not waive the right to
receive such information, (ii) the party did not otherwise have access to such
information, and, most surprisingly, (iii) the agreement was unconscionable
when signed.415
The UPAA rule that inadequate disclosure is grounds for invalidating the
agreement only if it is also unconscionable when signed is unusually restrictive.
In a majority of U.S. jurisdictions, inadequate disclosure alone is enough to
invalidate the agreement.416 I would encourage the revision of the UPAA to
follow this majority rule.417 Before a premarital waiver of financial rights may be
enforced at divorce, it should be shown that the waiving party was already
familiar with the other party’s financial condition or received adequate
disclosure of such information in connection with the negotiation and execution
of the agreement.
The UPAA permits a party to waive the right to disclosure. To ensure that
any waiver of rights is a “knowing” waiver, particularly if independent counsel
is not to be required, a waiver of disclosure should not be permitted.
iii. Understanding the Consequences of the Agreement
Numerous jurisdictions outside the U.S. enforce premarital agreements only
where the waiving party understood the impact of the premarital agreement
when it was signed; most require independent counsel or a consultation with a
civil law notary.418 In addition, in a recent attempt to clarify English law, the
Supreme Court of England stated that a premarital agreement should be
enforced “where the parties were informed of its implications.”419 The English
Law Commission proposed, in a recent Consultation Paper pertaining to marital
property agreements, that an agreement should be enforced only if both parties
received independent counsel.420 To date, U.S. jurisdictions do not require both
parties to a premarital agreement have independent counsel.421 (This may in part
be due to the added cost of such a requirement.)422 In a number of cases, the
waiving party at divorce claimed that the scope and effect of the agreement was

415. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001).
416. See supra Part III. B.
417. Some “adopting” states made this change, such as Connecticut, Iowa, Nevada, and New
Jersey. See supra Part II. B. iv. Professor Atwood has endorsed this change. See Atwood, supra note
45, at 149.
418. See supra Part V.
419. See supra Part II. B. iv.
420. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 198, MARITAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS
107 (2011).
421. See supra Part III. C.
422. A recent study commissioned by the English Law Commission found that English lawyers
reported an average legal fee charged for representing a party in connection with a premarital
agreement of approximately £5400, or a little more than $8,000. LAW COMMISSION REPORT: A STUDY
OF THE VIEWS AND APPROACHES OF FAMILY PRACTITIONERS CONCERNING MARITAL PROPERTY
AGREEMENTS, at 52–53.
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misrepresented when presented.423 In light of past U.S. reluctance to adopt a
requirement that each party have independent counsel, it would be unwise to
suggest such a requirement in any U.S. uniform law. But if each party does not
have a lawyer, how could it be made more likely that both parties at least
understand the basic effect of the agreement?424
As mentioned above, many states require, as a condition of enforcing a
waiver of economic rights upon divorce, that the waiving party had sufficient
information regarding the financial condition of the other party to have a general
idea of what he or she was being asked to waive. U.S. courts have been less
concerned about whether the party waiving the rights understood the legal
significance of what was being signed.
The current California statute provides some guidance about how this could
be accomplished.425 To create an enforceable premarital agreement, if the
waiving party is not represented by independent counsel, before execution the
other party must give the waiving party a written summary of “the terms and
basic effect of the agreement as well as the rights and obligations he or she [is]
giving up by signing the agreement.”426 The ALI makes a similar suggestion that
a presumption of voluntary execution could be established by adding such a
summary to the agreement itself.427
It is not clear that the summary
contemplated by the ALI proposal would be clearly visible; there is no
requirement that the summary be in bold-faced type, for example. It would be
preferable to provide the summary in a separate document to the unrepresented
party before the agreement is signed, as is required in California. This
requirement should be incorporated into a revised UPAA to help unrepresented
parties understand the effect of the proposed agreement before it is signed.

423. See, e.g., Ware v. Ware, 7 So.3d 271 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Liebelt v. Liebelt, 801 P.2d 52
(Idaho Ct. App. 1990).
424. Studies suggest that Americans generally are not familiar with legal rules. See generally
Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 234–36 (1989). See
also Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 441–45 (1993) (finding that
people about to marry were not very familiar with rules applicable to marriage and divorce); Heather
Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements?, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL JOHN M. OLIN CENTER
FOR LAW, ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS DISCUSSION SERIES, Paper 436 (2003), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/436 (finding also that people who had recently applied for a
marriage license had little knowledge about how marriage affected their rights). Some commentators
have argued that both parties should be required to have independent counsel in the U.S. See Gail
Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229 (1994); Judith T.
Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
349 (2007); Bix, supra note 407, at 207; David Westfall, Unprincipled Family Dissolution: The ALI’s
Recommendation for Division of Property, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY (Robin Wilson ed. 2006) 180.
425. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c)(3) (West 2004).
426. Id. If the right to spousal support is impacted, the waiving party must have counsel.
427. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 399, at § 7.04(3)(c). In Texas, spouses can agree to transform
separate property into community property. Such an agreement is enforceable, however, only if the
agreement sets forth the legal effect of converting property from separate to community. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.205(a)(2) (Vernon 2011).
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iv. Summary
I am proposing that premarital agreements be enforced only if the
circumstances surrounding execution satisfy various specific bargaining
safeguards. Many U.S. courts over the past few decades have permitted
oppressive and unfair bargaining in connection with premarital agreements, and
clearly defined bargaining limits need to be promulgated.
Even if the drafters of the revised UPAA decide to retain a set of rules
giving parties substantial assurance that an agreement will be enforced, it is
difficult to quarrel with more robust, while still reasonable, procedural
safeguards where the ground rules are clearly set forth. If more substantial
procedural safeguards would be added to existing requirements, the party
desiring an enforceable agreement merely would need to be sure that the
circumstances surrounding execution comply with this new set of rules.
B. Limiting the Enforcement of Agreements Due to Substantive Fairness
Concerns
In addition to the procedural requirements discussed in the preceding
section, a separate, and perhaps more difficult, issue is whether parts or all of a
premarital agreement should not be enforced due to substantive fairness
concerns. A question related to the latter issue is whether any limits should be
placed on the ability of parties to change the rules governing the economic
consequences of divorce.
i. Restrictions Upon or Waivers of the Right to Spousal Support
It seems fair to say that there is no U.S. consensus regarding the extent to
which parties should be able to restrict the right to spousal support. The UPAA
allows waivers of spousal support unless the waiving spouse would become a
public charge.428 If the spouse would thereby become a public charge, the court
is authorized to award such support so that the waiving party would not qualify
for public benefits.429
A number of other states have established more limits upon the ability of
parties to restrict the right to spousal support. For example, even some adopting
states bar restrictions on the right to spousal support.430 In California, a
restriction on spousal support is only enforceable if the party agreeing to the
restriction was represented by independent counsel. Such a restriction will not
be enforced even with advice of counsel if the provision is unconscionable at
divorce.431
In Colorado, spousal support restrictions are unenforceable if the waiving
party would as a result not be able to provide for his or her reasonable postdivorce needs.432 Another approach is to not enforce such a waiver if the

428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001).
Id.
See supra Part II. B. iii. (mentioning Iowa, South Dakota, and New Mexico).
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615.
See In re Marriage of Dechant, 867 P.2d 193 (Colo. App. 1993).
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waiving party would thereby experience a substantial change in circumstances
from the marital standard of living after divorce.433
In Indiana, spousal support restrictions are not to be enforced if they would
result in “extreme hardship.”434 Illinois bars the enforcement of such restrictions
if the restrictions would cause “undue hardship” as a result of an unforeseeable
change of circumstances during marriage.435 In other states, where an agreement
is not to be enforced if unconscionable at divorce, courts have been more inclined
to find unconscionability if there was a waiver of both equitable distribution and
the right to spousal support.436
In a few states, the right to spousal support may not be impacted. In many
states, there is almost total contractual freedom, while in a number of others a
restriction on spousal support is subject to some sort of fairness review. Given
this lack of agreement, what might be a sensible compromise?
One option would be to distinguish between marriages where parties raise a
common biological or adoptive child and childless marriages. In relationships
where the parties raise children, the primary caretaker customarily incurs
lifetime career damage.437 This damage can leave the primary caretaker
economically vulnerable in the event of divorce, and the damage may be
unforeseeable before the parties marry.438 Because of this unique aspect of
marriages with children, couples in childless marriages should be free to restrict
or eliminate spousal support while those who raise children together should not.
This proposed change would not place a dramatic restriction on the ability
of couples with children to modify their rights upon divorce. For example,
consider the result in Gross v. Gross.439 There the wealthy party was able to retain
the $6,000,000 that had been accumulated during marriage, but the premarital
agreement’s support restriction was not enforced, so the waiving party received
indefinite monthly support of $2,500.440 This result is vastly different from what
would have occurred absent an agreement.
Similarly, in Millstein v. Millstein,441 the husband had assets worth $28
million when the marriage began; after nineteen years of marriage his net worth
was $120 million.442 The court upheld the agreement waiving equitable
distribution and awarded the wife indefinite monthly alimony of $9,000.443

433. See Rogers v. Gordon, 961 A.2d 11 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2008).
434. See IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-11-3-8 (West 2001)
435. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(b) (West 2009).
436. See supra notes 257–70 and accompanying text.
437. See generally Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse,
90 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1519–27 (2005). See also J. Thomas Oldham, 80 CALIF. L. REV 1091 (1992) (book
review); David Leonhardt, The Different Costs of Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/the-different-costs-of-motherhood/.
438. See Starnes, supra note 437.
439. 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984).
440. See id. at 510.
441. 2002 WL 31031676 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
442. Id. at *10, *15.
443. Id. at *19.
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Likewise, in Lane v. Lane,444 the court enforced the waiver of equitable
distribution—thereby allowing the wealthy spouse to retain most of the
property—but declined to enforce the maintenance waiver, so the waiving party
was awarded a monthly payment of $12,000 for three years.445
The approach suggested here would always give the court the power, in
those marriages where the parties raised children, to award support to a
dependent spouse upon divorce. In contrast, parties in childless marriages
generally would be able to restrict or eliminate the possibility of spousal support
if they so desired.
ii. Not Enforcing an Agreement Due to Substantive Unfairness
If the proposals suggested above are enacted, is there a need for any type of
fairness review of premarital agreements? Under the UPAA, substantive fairness
is considered only at the time of execution, and an agreement is unenforceable
only if found “unconscionable” at that time and the waiving party did not have
adequate information regarding the other party’s financial condition.446 Two
features of the UPAA rule should be noted. On one hand, the focus is on the
time of execution, not enforcement. In addition, an agreement is enforceable—in
spite of its unconscionability upon execution—if the waiving party had adequate
financial information or waived the right to such information. In many other
non-UPAA states, the focus is on the unconscionability of the agreement at the
time of enforcement, not execution, and a finding of unconscionability alone is
sufficient to render an agreement unenforceable.447
This is consistent with the evolving rules in other jurisdictions. A recent
444. 202 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006).
445. Id. at 579.
446. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001).
447. See supra Part IV. A. This is true in some states that adopted the UPAA with some changes,
such as Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Dakota. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §46b-36g(a)(2)
(West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §37:2-37 (West 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (2009).
I have discussed elsewhere the appropriate time for a review of the unconscionability of a premarital
agreement:
Admittedly, courts normally determine the unconscionability of a commercial contract
according to the circumstances existing at the time of execution. Still, marital contracts are
somewhat different from commercial transactions. First, in marital contracts spouses plan
for what will occur at dissolution. The marriage, however, may not be dissolved for
decades. The term of most commercial contracts is much shorter. Second, important
public policy concerns relate to the circumstances of the spouses at divorce, not at the time
the contract was signed. The circumstances of spouses can change dramatically during a
marriage. For example, one spouse may develop health problems or may have a
diminished earning capacity as a result of working solely as a homemaker. Few would
dispute that the state has a strong interest in attempting to ensure that each spouse will be
financially self-sufficient after divorce, and that any children will be adequately supported.
Consequently, the state has a strong interest in policing the substantive fairness of the
division of property at divorce. The circumstances of the parties at the time the marital
contract was signed are irrelevant to these public policy concerns. So, the . . . focus upon
the fairness of a marital contract solely at the time of execution seems unwise. If
substantive fairness is to be relevant to the question of enforceability of marital contracts,
the focus should be upon the fairness of the contract at divorce.
J. Thomas Oldham, Premarital Agreements Are Now Enforceable, Unless . . ., 21 HOUS. L. REV. 757, 775–76
(1984) (citations omitted).
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English decision states that marital agreements should be enforced only if they
are “fair” and there has not been a change in the parties’ circumstances so
enforcement of the agreement would not be “manifestly unjust.”448 In New
Zealand, an agreement is not to be enforced if it would cause “serious
injustice.”449 If there was unconscionable conduct, the agreement is not to be
enforced in Australia.450 “Unfair” agreements are not enforceable in British
Columbia.451
Some commentators have been critical of the lack of a significant review of
the substantive fairness of premarital agreements at divorce.452 A few urge a
return to the old rule that premarital agreements attempting to change the rules
governing the economic consequences of divorce should not be permitted.453
Other commentators have proposed a more rigorous review of the substantive
fairness of agreements at the time of divorce.454 Professor Brod has proposed
that an agreement should be reviewed at divorce for its “economic justice.”455
Another has suggested that courts should consider an agreement that does not
provide for an approximately equal division of marital property presumptively
unenforceable.456 Professors Atwood and Younger have argued that agreements
that are unconscionable at divorce should not be enforced.457
The ALI Principles also suggest a relatively substantial fairness review of an
agreement at divorce.458 Under the ALI, an agreement is not to be enforced if the
objecting party can establish that enforcement would “work a substantial
injustice.”459
The current UPAA position regarding the level of substantive fairness
review at divorce is significantly different from the scrutiny applied in many
jurisdictions, as well as the recommendation made in the ALI Principles and by
numerous U.S. commentators. An apparent concern of the UPAA drafters was
to provide a set of rules that would result in agreements being enforced in almost
all instances. Of course, it does seem important to promulgate a set of rules that
will generally allow parties to predict when agreements will be enforced.
However, there are other legitimate societal concerns that arise when

448. See supra notes 327–31 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 340–41 and accompanying text.
450. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
451. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
452. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEVE.
ST. L. REV. 359 (2006); Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Should Marital Property Rights Be Inalienable?
Preserving the Marriage Ante, 82 NEB. L. REV. 460 (2003).
453. See Sherman, supra note 452; McLaughlin, supra note 452.
454. See Brod, supra note 424 (defining an economically unjust agreement as one where a party is
significantly worse off economically than before marriage).
455. See id.
456. See Comment, Marriage as Contract and Marriage as Partnership: The Future of Antenuptial
Agreement Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2075 (2003).
457. See Atwood, supra note 45; Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An
Update, 8 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 42 (1992).
458. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 399, at § 7.05.
459. See id.
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contemplating the extent to which parties should be able to modify the economic
consequences of divorce. If a party will suffer substantial hardship after divorce
due to the enforcement of an agreement, this hardship is a legitimate
consideration when evaluating potential limits on parties’ ability to change the
rules applicable to the economic consequences of divorce.460
A potential compromise between the current UPAA position and the view
proposed in the ALI Principles would be to enforce an agreement unless the
court finds the terms are unconscionable at divorce.461 I have previously
proposed another approach to this issue: courts should inquire whether there
was a substantial and unforeseen change in the parties’ circumstances during
marriage.462 My proposed standard reflects my previous recommendation.
This proposed standard should not result in wholesale invalidation of
premarital agreements. As the discussion above shows, courts have only rarely
invalidated agreements in states currently applying this standard.463
VII. CONCLUSION
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the UPAA about a decade after the concept of premarital
agreements contemplating divorce was first tentatively accepted in the U.S.464
The fundamental goal of the UPAA drafters seemed to be to formulate a set of
rules that would make it very likely premarital agreements would be enforced
upon divorce.465 While this overarching goal may still be useful, it is clear that
some revisions to the UPAA are now needed to protect parties from unfair
bargaining tactics and the extreme unfairness which often results from
substantial changes in the circumstances of the parties during marriage.
The UPAA’s most glaring problem is that it has sanctioned oppressive
bargaining.
Courts have often enforced agreements where the more
sophisticated party first presented the agreement a day or two before the
wedding and informed the other (normally unsophisticated) party that the
agreement must be signed or the wedding will be called off. This places the
other party in an extremely difficult situation. It is quite unlikely that
independent counsel can be located and consulted on such short notice. In
addition, there is little time to consider any advice received or to reflect upon the
agreement’s terms and negotiate changes. The (normally unsophisticated) party
being asked to waive rights therefore is forced to decide, frequently once

460. See generally Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L. REV.
1059 (1988).
461. See id. at 1089–90; Ronald Ladden & Robert Franco, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act: An
Ill-Reasoned Retreat from the Unconscionability Analysis, 4 AMER. J. FAM. L. 267, 274–77 (1990); S.
Christine Mercing, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act: Survey of tis Impact in Texas and
Across the Nation, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 825 (1990); Suzanne Reynolds, Premarital Agreements, 13
CAMPBELL L. REV. 343 (1991).
462. See Oldham, Premarital Agreements Are Now Enforceable, supra note 447, at 778.
463. See supra Part IV.B.
464. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 39 (2001).
465. See id.
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wedding festivities have already begun and without the benefit of independent
counsel, whether to sign the agreement as presented or cancel the wedding. If a
waiver of substantial rights in a premarital agreement is to be enforceable, a
fairer system must be put in place to guarantee the waiver was freely and
knowingly signed without undue pressure.
The model statute attached as Schedule A contemplates that the bargaining
process could be improved by generally requiring that: (i) the party being asked
to waive rights be given at least seven days after the agreement is first presented
to consider whether to retain counsel, ask for revisions, and sign the agreement;
and (ii) the agreement generally needs to be signed by both parties at least seven
days before the wedding.466 An agreement signed within forty-eight hours of the
wedding would never be enforced.467 These requirements would guarantee that
the party being asked to waive rights would have more notice of the issue (at
least two weeks before the wedding) than is common today and would have
more time to consider whether to meet with independent counsel or negotiate
changes. In addition, the proposal encourages parties to decide whether to sign
the agreement or cancel the wedding a week before the wedding instead of (as
commonly occurs now) when the wedding weekend had already begun. It is
likely parties could make a more intelligent decision regarding whether to sign
the agreement if the decision is made a week—not hours—before the wedding.
It is not uncommon for parties not represented by counsel to contend at
dissolution of a marriage that they misunderstood the effect of the premarital
agreement.468 Perhaps for this reason, some countries require both parties have
independent counsel before a premarital agreement will be enforced. My
proposal does not include such a requirement, at least in part because U.S. courts
and legislatures have been so reluctant to accept such a requirement. This
proposal does require that, if a party is not represented by counsel, and the other
is, the other party (or the lawyer for that party) must give a written summary of
the general effect of the agreement to the unrepresented party, in a document
independent of the agreement itself, before the agreement is signed.469 The
proposal also requires each party be “generally informed” regarding the assets
and income of the other party; a waiver of this requirement is not permitted.470
These proposed changes to the rules governing whether to enforce a
premarital agreement are suggested to make it more likely that the party being
asked to waive rights will be aware of the agreement’s impact on his or her rights
and will have more time to consider whether to sign the proposed agreement or
propose revisions. When compared to current law, the bargaining standards
reflected in this proposal are more congruent with the confidential relationship
that exists between people engaged to be married.
The attached proposal also includes substantive fairness limits on

466. See infra Schedule A.
467. See id.
468. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shirilla, 89 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2004); In re Estate of Smid, 756 N.W.2d 1
(S.D. 2008); Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
469. See infra Schedule A.
470. See id.
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premarital agreements. Parties who raise one or more common biological or
adoptive children are barred from restricting the right to spousal support. In
addition, a court is instructed not to enforce the agreement if it would cause
undue hardship to a spouse because the circumstances of the parties changed
during marriage for reasons not foreseeable by the parties when they married.
These provisions include some minimal protection for dependent spouses if a
divorce occurs while still granting prospective spouses substantial freedom to
modify customary economic consequences of divorce.
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SCHEDULE A
SUGGESTED STATUTORY SCHEME TO REGULATE PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS
CONTEMPLATING DIVORCE
1. Enforcement
A premarital agreement should be enforced if:
(a) circumstances surrounding execution did not place undue pressure on either
party;
(b) each party was generally informed regarding the assets and income of the
other party when the agreement was signed;
(c) each party generally understood the legal effect of the agreement; and
(d) enforcement would not cause undue hardship to either party due to a change
in the parties’ circumstances during marriage that was not foreseeable at the time
the agreement was signed.
2. Undue Pressure
(a) A presumption arises that the circumstances surrounding execution of the
agreement did not place undue pressure on either party if:
(1) the final agreement was signed a minimum of seven days after the initial
written draft of the agreement was delivered to both parties; and
(2) the agreement was signed by both parties a minimum of seven days before
the wedding.
(b) If the timing of the negotiation or execution of the agreement did not comply
with section (2) (a) hereof, a rebuttable presumption arises that the circumstances
surrounding execution placed undue pressure on the parties.
(c) A conclusive presumption that the circumstances surrounding execution of
the agreement placed undue pressure on the parties shall arise if the agreement
is signed within forty-eight hours of the wedding.
3. Understanding the Legal Effect of the Agreement
A party generally understands the legal effect of the agreement if:
(1) the party was represented by independent counsel selected by that party in
connection with the negotiations regarding the agreement; or
(2) one party was not represented by independent counsel and the other party
was represented, and the unrepresented party received from the other party
before the agreement was signed a written summary of the terms and basic
effects of the agreement as well as a general description of the rights he or she
was giving up by signing the agreement.
If one party was represented by independent counsel and the objecting party did
not receive legal advice, if the provisions of section 3(2) hereof were not
complied with, the agreement should not be enforced.

Oldham_Paginated (Do Not Delete)

3/13/2012 10:20 AM

A REEVALUATION OF THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT

131

4. Limiting Spousal Support
Any term in the agreement restricting the right to claim post-divorce spousal
support is not valid if the parties during marriage raised a common biological or
adoptive child.

